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A Note on Dates, Names, Translation, and Transliteration 
 Dates included in this thesis, to the best of my knowledge and abilities, follow New Style, 
Gregorian calendar notation.  When my sources offered both, I included only the New Style 
dates. Those few works that published dates following the Julian calendar system without noting 
so are the only sources of Old Style dating in my thesis.  Their unknown nature, unfortunately, 
prevents me from noting or correcting them.  I apologize and take full responsibility for any 
inconsistencies. 
In most instances, I follow the contemporary Library of Congress style for transliterating 
names and reproduced passages from the original Russian. In several cases, however, convention 
and previous authorship have popularized an older or different version of certain words.  This 
frequently occurs with proper nouns and names. Thus, rather than Ermolov, I use the more 
recognizable Yermolov, and Alexander rather than Aleksandr. In some cases, the names 
themselves have been westernized in popular usage. As such, Tolstoy appears in my writing as 
Leo rather than his given Lev, and I study the influence of Tsar Nicholas rather than that of Tsar 
Nikolai.   
Most of the works I analyze were ably translated by the scholars mentioned in the 
corresponding footnotes and bibliographic entries, but I have attempted my own translation of 
Fedor Fedorovich Tornau’s Memoirs of a Caucasian Officer. When citing these passages in the 
text, I provide my English translations with the original Russian in footnotes.  I am grateful to 
my advisor, Professor David Shneer, for checking my translations, but all errors are of my own 
commission.   
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Finally, like all authors who write about the Conquest or the complex interactions 
between peoples on the Caucasian isthmus, I was faced with the difficult task of carrying on a 
coherent, digestible conversation concerning a panoply of peoples, places, and individuals.  
Where they are encapsulated by quotation marks, specific names receive scholarly treatment (my 
own or existing) and more thorough treatment. Elsewhere, I use terms like djigit, gortsi, 
mountaineer, Circassian, and occasionally native or indigenous person, in a casually synonymous 
fashion.  I do this with full recognition that such light usage can and all too often has obscured 
important histories, individual identities and agency, and moral variances.  I have made every 
effort to keep this thesis varied enough in diction to keep the readers’ attention and still maintain 
a genuine and complete respect for the uniqueness and interests of the peoples I describe. 
Lawrence Myers 
 2/23/2013 
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The Caucasus in the beginning of the 19
th
 century [map]. 2.3cm = 100 mi. In: Yermolov,          
Aleksei, trans./ed. Alexander Mikaberidze, The Czar’s General: The Memoirs of a Russian 
General in the Napoleonic Wars (Welwyn Garden City, UK: Ravenhall Books, 2005), 220. 
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In his 2010 contribution to a series of papers written for the United States Institute of 
Peace, political scientist Jason Lyall investigated the effects of ethnicity in counterinsurgency 
campaigns.
1
  For his case study, Lyall selected the post-Soviet Russian Federation and its 
struggle against Chechen separatists. The aspect of the conflict that most interested Lyall for his 
project was the Russian counterinsurgency during the Second Chechen War, which began in 
August 1999 and, at the time of his article’s publication, was an ongoing conflict.2 
According to Lyall, the Caucasus is a uniquely valuable environment in which to study 
violence. During his appearance on Yale University’s “The MacMillan Report,” Lyall cautiously 
and hesitantly labeled the region a “laboratory” in which he and other scholars might experiment 
and measure the accuracy of their models. He valued its relatively small geographic area, the 
incredible diversity of languages and cultures, and the broad spectrum of natural environments.  
Interestingly, Lyall even discussed the region’s various and diverse types of violence, a 
phenomenon he confidently ascribed to a corresponding multitude of ethnicities. His 
“experiments” focused on the efficacy of counterinsurgency tactics as executed by Russians and 
pro-Russian Chechens against Chechen insurgents.
3
 In particular, Lyall compared the results of 
“sweeping operations” (zachistki).4   
Lyall describes a resistance led by a “prominent rebel commander” named Shamil, 
Chechens fleeing Russian bombardment, and fighters abandoning conventional warfare for 
                                                          
1
 Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” 
American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 1-20. 
2
 Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents?,” 1-2.  
3
 Jason Lyall, interviewed by Marilyn Wilkes, “Episode: March 31, 2010, Guest Jason Lyall, Postdoctoral Research 
Associate in the Department of Political Science,” The MacMillan Report, Yale University, 11:44, March 31, 2010, 
http://www.yale.edu/macmillanreport/ep44-lyall-033110.html.  
4
 Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents?,” 1. 
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guerilla tactics, a decision better suited to their smaller numbers and intimate familiarity with the 
terrain.  All of this led ultimately to a much reduced but nevertheless fierce resistance 
“pinned…in Chechnya’s mountainous south.” To combat these intransigent mountain rebels, the 
Russian army conducted “armed house-by-house…checks” after blockading and isolating a 
target community.  These sweeps would last for as much as a month and have “become 
synonymous with excesses by…Russian soldiers.” The Russian Army is infamous in the region 
for its “use of indiscriminate violence, forced disappearances (about 5,000 since 1999), and 
extrajudicial killings.”5  
Lyall posits that the genesis of many civil wars lies in the unresolved or ambiguous 
conclusion of a preceding conflict, and that by experimenting in his “lab,” he and others might 
learn more about civil wars, counterinsurgency conflicts, and multi-ethnic violence.
6
. I will lay 
the foundations for this by showing that the same issues Lyall finds defining the Second Chechen 
War also defined the Great Caucasian War (1817-1864) and the conflicts that led up to it.
7
 The 
sweeping operations, and more generally Lyall’s summary of the Second Chechen War, eerily 
echo Russian military efforts in the Caucasus more than 150 years earlier during Russia’s most 
concerted imperial conquest of the region.  Though almost 200 years separate the 19th century 
surge of Russian involvement in the Caucasus and the Second Chechen War, the violence and 
nature of the conflict seem almost identical.  The weapons are newer and more indiscriminately 
lethal, but the tactics and brutality—the palpable sense of vitriol and hatred—seem timeless and 
unchanged. 
                                                          
5
 Ibid., 1-3. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 The Great Caucasian War is also sometimes known simply as the Caucasian War. I refer to it largely by the latter 
throughout this thesis. 
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On the heels of Catherine the Great’s historic expansion of the Russian empire, 
Alexander I and Nicholas I’s 19th century Russia was engaged in no fewer than three large-scale 
military campaigns, most notably the Napoleonic War of 1812.  But the first half of the 19
th
 
century was also the apogee of Russian military involvement in the Caucasus, a war that 
engendered a legacy of violence, terror, and hatred that lasts to the present day.   This thesis 
argues that in order to understand why the Russians executed this war in such a comprehensively 
violent fashion, one must first look at how they perceived their enemy. 
I will demonstrate that orientalist thought, in which Russia’s enemies to the south were 
portrayed as uncivilized, hyper-sexualized, and uncontrollably violent, preconditioned successive 
generations of the officers and commanders responsible for waging the war to unreasonably fear, 
despise, and hate the peoples of the Caucasus.
8
  These emotions and evaluations were reinforced 
by the intense, internecine war that should have been far more simple, quickly executed, and 
much less costly in lives and resources for the numerically, technologically, and logistically 
better-equipped Russian armies.   As a result of their interpretations of these peoples, Russian 
treatment of Caucasian peoples and the land itself was inordinately exploitative and violent. 
Historian and scholar of Western Imperialism Susan Kent precedes and guides my 
methodology for the examination of literary and historical sources in conjunction to analyze their 
effects on each other and on colonial and imperial ventures. In tandem with American cultural 
historian Philip Deloria, the two parse a broadly utilitarian definition of culture as: 
The word we use to describe the ways we think about (1) the transmission and 
transformation of meanings, (2) the practices that place those meanings in the 
                                                          
8
 I use the term orientalism to generally reference Edward Said’s critique of British and French studies of “the 
East,” though he excluded Russia’s long history of eastern studies, or vostokovedenie, when he discussed the 
consequences of Western discourse concerning “the Orient.” See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978). 
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world, and (3) the full range of consequences surrounding those meanings: how 
they structure our senses of self, group, and world; how they both delimit and 
open up our possibilities; how they cross social, political, and other kinds of 
boundaries; how they take shape in human creations.
9
 
 
This definition hints at the potential real-world stakes involved in cultural production and 
suggests the areas of interest to this thesis.  They augment this definition, suggesting scholars 
should conceive of the object (i.e. the culture) of a particular field of cultural studies—in this 
case Russian—as a series of “layers”: “physical place,” “social world”, “cultural field,” and most 
pertinently to my thesis, “As an imaginary [layer], a set of dreams and ideals that motivate 
people to believe, think, and act in certain ways.”10  This last layer in particular provided the 
final catalyst in my conception of the ideas that shape this thesis.
11
   
My thesis proceeds from these understandings of culture to develop a causal relationship 
between thought and action.  Kent and Deloria include Clifford Geertz’s characterization of the 
value of cultural studies to augment their own discussion, and while I can agree with his artful 
assertions about culture that “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
spun,” I must disagree with his conclusion that the ultimate goal of cultural analysis is a “search 
[for] meaning.”12  When fundamentally disparate cultures meet and interact, there are real and 
often bloody consequences that render Geertz’s search for meaning seem almost inconsequential 
in comparison. 
                                                          
9
 Philip Delorian and Susan Kent, Personal Correspondence, 12/12/12. 
10
 Delorian and Kent, Personal Correspondence. 
11
 Marc Matera, Misty Bastian, and Susan Kent, The Women’s War of 1929: Gender and Violence in Colonial Nigeria 
(New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011) was my first introduction to the linkage between literary works and the 
commission of imperial violence.   
12
 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” The Interpretation of Cultures 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5. 
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My work picks up where literary orientalism left off and examines more closely the 
correlation between the presence of orientalist attitudes in primary source material and the 
Russian actions and decisions in this conflict. This investigation begins in part with the immortal 
Russian poet Alexander Pushkin and his seminal work “The Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1821-
22), which in many ways “created” the Caucasus and its peoples in the popular imagination of 
19
th
 century Russia. I then examine author-soldiers Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bestuzhev-
Marlinsky, Mikhail Iurevich Lermontov and Leo Nikolaievich Tolstoy—who all fought in the 
Caucasus—and established their reputations not as military strategists, but as fictional authors 
writing during their service in the region about their experiences.  These last authors bridge the 
gap between literary and historical analysis as all three served in the Russian military in the 
Caucasus during the first half of the 19
th
 century and wrote about the conflict. Though they did 
not produce war memoirs per se, their fictive literary offerings were nevertheless based in real 
world experiences as military men who fought in the Caucasus and observed that brutal conflict 
first hand.  In addition to this corpus of empirical fiction, I evaluate the writings of Russian 
officers who fought in the Caucasus, showing how their letters and memoirs were permeated 
with identical orientalist language. These officers, Aleksei Petrovich Yermolov, and to a lesser 
extent, Fedor Fedorovich Tornau, played major roles in developing diplomatic, strategic, and 
tactical decisions in the Caucasus.  I then connect these diarists’ perceptions of the enemy and 
the land with their actual prosecution of the war.  Thus this thesis demonstrates that how Russian 
officers conceived of the Caucasus and its peoples determined both the need and means to 
conquer them. 
My thesis examines how the Russians who lived, visited, or fought there thought of the 
land, people, and culture, and demonstrates how those perceptions—many of them pre-formed 
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and non-empirical—contributed to and guided the formation of the strategic and tactical 
decisions these men made in the isthmus.  By expanding the analysis of orientalist discourse 
from consequences in writing to consequences in real life for real people, this thesis increases the 
stakes in the debate over perceptions of “the other” and how nations commit and justify violence.  
Lyall’s studies of violence in the late 20th and early 21st centuries show that the Russian conquest 
of the Caucasus is not an historical event to be relegated to the margins of social consciousness 
and academic curiosity.  The strained relations between Moscow and the various enclaves in the 
region today derive from a long history of terror and violence.  Like Lyall, I study conflict in the 
“laboratory” of the Caucasian isthmus to improve our understanding of the origins and nature of 
multi-ethnic violence.   
Studies of Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus date back to the early 20th century.  John F. 
Baddeley, a British journalist and frequent visitor to Russia, conducted the first extensive, 
English language investigation of Russia’s Caucasian War in the late 1800s and early 1900s and 
published his conclusions in 1908.  As the St. Petersburg correspondent for the London 
Standard, he used his privileged access to the archives and resources in Russia that had been 
heretofore “unexamined,” Baddeley meticulously constructed a monolithic, eponymous history 
of Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus.13  Although he relied almost entirely on Russian sources (a 
fact which he openly admits in his introduction to The Conquest and for which he makes a 
genuine effort at compensation in his discourse), Baddeley is credited to this day for an 
                                                          
13
 John Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1999). And by 
“unexamined,” it is likely that Baddeley simply meant that Western European historians had not yet combed these 
archives. 
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otherwise objective, equitable treatment of the subject and widely cited in most contemporary 
scholarship on Russia’s involvement in the region.14 
Baddeley combed numerous archives and volumes of collected letters, notes, and diaries 
of generals and other officers, the Tsars/Tsarinas, and any others involved.  His work enumerates 
casualties, troop numbers, supplies, miles marched, and the path of the Russians in and through 
the Caucasus in exhaustive detail.  Baddeley detailed—painstakingly and chronologically—
Russia’s involvement in the region as it pressed inexorably onward.  He only minimally 
examined Russian perceptions of the Caucasus and the often brutal treatment of Caucasian 
people; moreover, he failed to significantly connect perceptions with conduct.  The author 
documented Yermolov’s use of terror and overwhelming violence to instill obedience in the 
region, but largely looked no further than that commander’s inherent sense of duty to Russia and 
the constant pressure to achieve results for the Tsar as the driving forces that ultimately delivered 
victory and the isthmus to the Romanovs in the 19th century.  In other words, Baddeley 
overlooked what more contemporary scholarship might have considered—what preconceived 
notions of “the enemy” Russian military officers had in their heads as they participated in the 
conquest of the Caucasus.   
From Baddeley, historical scholarship in this area is drawn inexorably to the works of 
University of Tel Aviv historian Moshe Gammer and a contemporary generation of scholars 
interested in this liminal conflict.  Gammer’s first book was praised for its analysis of multi-
lingual archival analysis (i.e. Gammer is informed by more than just the Russian perspective and 
                                                          
14
 See Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan 
(Portland: Frank Cass, 1994), xv for explicit praise by the foremost contemporary historian in the field of Russian-
Caucasian interaction.    
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examined works in Turkish and Arabic).
15
  Following this work, Gammer went on to eventually 
publish The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule and 
numerous journal articles concerning this clash of cultures.
16
  Gammer added to the field by 
drawing on correspondence among Caucasians, between Caucasians and Russians, and perhaps 
most significantly, by analyzing the political and religious material of the time from the 
Caucasian perspective.
17
  Gammer’s work turned Baddeley’s bi-polar conflict of military 
sovereignty into a multi-valent conflict for cultural, economic, and social independence.   
Like Gammer, whose Muslim Resistance to the Tsar and The Lone Wolf and the Bear 
focused on the history behind Russia’s relations with specific peoples, Czech political scientist 
Emil Souleimanov’s An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective is primarily 
interested in Russian interactions with Chechens.
18
 Endless War is useful for its demographic 
and anthropological perspective on the Chechens.  His investigation of social norms and cultural 
idiosyncrasies provides a contemporary picture against which one may measure the similar 
descriptions provided by literary figures like Lermontov and Tolstoy.  Souleimanov seems most 
interested in the cultural causes of the conflict, and even analyzes the brutality of Yermolov, but 
he ignores the cultural factors which this thesis argues pushed the Russians to treat with the 
Chechens as they did.  Moreover, his focus is on Chechnya’s role in Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russia.  Historian David Seely also investigates the genesis and unfolding of Russia’s long war 
                                                          
15
 Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar. 
16
 Moshe Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006). His article “’Proconsul of the Caucasus:’ A Re-Examination of Yermolov,” 
Social Evolution and History 2, no. 1 (2003), 
http://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles/140480/?sphrase_id=443775 (accessed December 11, 2012) is one 
of several articles focused on the Russian-Caucasian interaction.  
17
 I use the term Caucasians as a catchall phrase for ease of communication. The region’s peoples are by no means 
a monolithic whole, and indeed the great diversity of the language, ethnicity, custom, and belief is a fundamental 
factor in both Russian perceptions of the region and the complexity of the ongoing conflict. This is a core issue in 
the investigation of this thesis and receives greater attention below. 
18
 Emil Souleimanov, An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 
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with Chechnya.
19
  I find his work problematic in its time frame (1800-2000), and like 
Souleimanov, his overt focus on the 20
th
 century.  Still, his work contributes occasional insights 
into the macro-nature of Russian strategy, and both he and Souleimanov support my contention 
that the consequences of Russia’s long history in the region have not yet played out.  Despite 
what I consider an occasionally myopic focus, these authors, bolstered by the work of a 
contemporary generation of historians, remind us that this struggle really is “endless.”20 
Literary scholars like Susan Layton and Peter Scotto analyzed how European and Russian 
orientalist perceptions of Asia—and specifically the Caucasus—shaped Russian interaction with 
the East.
21
  These scholars examined how descriptions of the people as fiery, wild, and savage, 
and of the land as a feminine conquest to be had and enjoyed by strong, virile Russian military 
officers, Tsars, and even vacationing aristocrats, shaped the language used to describe and relate 
Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus.  Other works note the 19th century Russian preoccupation 
with Caucasian wives, slave girls, and debauched drunkenness.
22
 Such works focus on how 
orientalist perceptions manifested in the writings of Lermontov, Tolstoy, and other literary 
greats.   
Historian David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye contributed to the field by lucidly 
differentiating Russian orientalism from classical Saidian orientalism.  For him, the primary 
                                                          
19
 Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict: 1800-2000: A Deadly Embrace (Portland: Frank Cass, 2001). 
20
 See for instance: Marie Broxup, “After the Putsch, 1991,” The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance 
towards the Muslim World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 219-240; Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, 
“Cooptation of the Elites of Karbarda and Daghestan in the sixteenth century,” The North Caucasus Barrier, 18-44; 
William Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 
1828-1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).  
21
 See Peter Scotto, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Ideologies of Imperialism in Lermontov’s ‘Bela,’” PMLA 107, no. 2 
(1992): 246-260 or Susan Layton, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  The latter is considered by many literary scholars (e.g. David 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye) to be the seminal work examining Russian orientalist discourse.   
22
 Susan Layton, “Eros and Empire in Russian Literature about Georgia,” Slavic Review 51, no. 2 (1992): 195-213. 
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difference between Russian and French/English views of “the East” is the ancient, ambivalent 
relationship Russians shared with Asia.
23
 Despite often-desperate attempts to assume a Western, 
European identity, the 19
th
 century slavophile movement, a national history inextricably meshed 
with Asia, and numerous “national minorities” whose ethnicity was decidedly non-Western, all 
instilled a certain sympathy and respect for “the Orient” in the Russian national consciousness.   
It is thus between the established historical and literary scholarship that my argument 
cleaves.  I add to the body of literary analysis by placing it firmly within a historical context and 
demonstrating that prejudicial thought did far more than guide the lexical selections of authors.  
By mediating between literary and historical scholarship, I argue that literary Russian orientalism 
informed more than simply the preconceptions of a generic Russian elite readership.  I show that 
these images of the Caucasus directly informed the military and cultural interaction between the 
Russians and the indigenous population of the Caucasus and engendered an often draconian, 
exploitative, and exceedingly violent martial policy which characterizes the memory of that war 
in the national memories of Caucasian ethnicities to this day. 
 
 Aside from a succinct, almost joking reference to Russia’s convoluted medieval 
sense of identity and the almost mythological origins of a Slavic presence in the Caucasus, 
Baddeley begins his seminal history of Russia’s efforts to conquer the region in the 16th 
century.
24
  Appropriately, this episode of first contact likely occurred between some of Russia’s 
                                                          
23
 David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the 
Emigration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 8-11. 
24
 I adopt the 16
th
 century as the start of Russia’s involvement in the Caucasus based on a distinction of what 
constitutes Russia.  The early Rus are still poorly understood and documented, but they are the group commonly 
recognized as the rulers of an early proto-Russian state.  Several Rus rulers made early attempts to extend their 
dominion to the south using their extensive knowledge of river navigation (most theories on the origins of the Rus 
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first Cossacks and the peoples in the northern Caucasus.  It is possible the Dnieper Zaporozhtsi 
Cossacks first encountered a Caucasian tribe.  This band of Cossacks, whose name meant “Those 
Who Live Beyond the Rapids” (za=beyond, porogi=rapids), was distinctive among Russian 
separatist movements, and certainly unique within the Cossack tradition.  Styling themselves as 
“warrior monks,” the Zaporozhtsi were ostensibly an all-male order.25  They constructed and 
operated from an island fortress, the sietcha, and fought in fierce defense of the Orthodox 
religion. This self-appointed crusade led them against the much-maligned, Catholic Poles and the 
Muslim Turks and Ottomans alike.
26
  As such, it is possible that the Zaporozhtsi initiated in 
microcosm the fight between Orthodox Russians and (largely) Muslim Caucasian tribes in which 
this thesis is interested.  Baddeley more definitively credits them at least with the creation of a 
Cossack-dominated liminal zone south and east of those regions controlled by Russia and 
Poland.
27
  
More likely, and Gammer, citing Tolstoy, agrees, the Cossacks to whom history should 
credit the establishment of regular relations between Russia and the people of the Caucasus were 
the Grebentsi, or Greben Cossacks.
28
  This band initially formed while fleeing the rule of Ivan III 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
elite suggest that Swedish Vikings—the Varangians—came to modern Ukraine and western Russia via dragon ships 
on that areas extensive waterways).  I exclude them from this thesis for the lack of sufficient documentation, the 
geographic area of their rule, and the very early nature of their state. 
25
 Baddeley seems less than convinced of the Zaporozhtsi’s masculine constitution.  While their role as the 
“vanguard of the vanguard” and intense military and Orthodox dedication may have been particularly poorly 
suited to family life, no Cossack band living on the edges of the Russian Empire could be said to have an easy 
existence.  Cossack women are famously strong and resilient, and their roles within Cossack society were far from 
comfortable or indulgent.  Moreover, Russian Orthodoxy does not have Catholicism’s dogma or history of celibate, 
mono-gendered orders.  This suggests that the Zaporozhtsi’s religious zealotry would not inherently push them to 
reject a life with women.  On what is perhaps a less analytical level, celibacy and performing their own house work 
seems very out of character for the infamously non-domestic, amorous Cossacks.  
26
 After the 1054 East-West Schism between the Catholic and Orthodox churches (in Russian Orthodox tradition, 
the first Raskol) and the 1480 declaration of independence from Sarai (the traditional seat of Mongol power), 
Poles, who served as one of Europe’s greatest champions of Catholicism during the late middle ages, became 
Russia’s new sworn enemy.  
27
 Baddeley, Conquest of the Caucasus, 1-5.  
28
 Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear, 8-9. 
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(r. 1462-1505).  Making their way down the Don and Volga Rivers, these fugitives eventually 
settled in their namesake hills near modern Grozny.
29
  During the reign of Ivan IV (r. 1547-
1584), grandson of the ruler from whom their ancestors fled almost a century earlier, the Greben 
Cossacks sent a deputation to Moscow pleading for the Tsar’s forgiveness and inclusion under 
his reign.  In a characteristically calculating move, Ivan granted their request on condition that 
they construct and defend a fort there at the confluence of the Sunzha.
30
  
Gammer distills two salient “historical facts” from this history, the first of which that 
serious Russian political interest in the region began with Ivan IV following his conquest of the 
Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) khanates.
31
 The historical and cultural significance of these 
conquests should not be overlooked nor underplayed; they marked the first concrete steps in 
reconquering the Eurasian steppe from the remnants of the Mongols.
32
  Ivan not only established 
precedent for Russian supremacy in the region by virtue of his conquest of these Mongol 
remnants, but also by marrying a Kabartay princess.  This marriage gave him claim to Karbarda 
and the Northern Caucasus region.  Perhaps more pertinent to the subject of this thesis, this 
wedding marked the first tsar of Russia marrying a Cherkess royal, the name from which 
Russians later derived the loaded term “Circassian.”  Thus combining political marriage, military 
conquest, and the pragmatic pardon of the Greben Cossacks, Ivan the Terrible established a 
pervasive presence in the region and a foothold—ideological, political, military, dynastic, and 
                                                          
29
 Greben=a comb or ridge, thus the Grebentsi were the “Cossacks of the Hills.” 
30
 Baddeley, Conquest of the Caucasus, 7-8. 
31
 Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear, 9. 
32
 Though the psychological and cultural impacts of the “Mongol yoke” are still regularly debated, few doubt that 
the 1223/37-1480 period of Mongol dominion was in many ways a fundamentally formative period in Russian 
History.  For a more conservative estimate on the impact of that conquest, see Janet Martin, Medieval Russia, 980-
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geographic—from which that ruler and his Romanov descendants would launch future 
campaigns.   
The second facet that interests Gammer is recognition of the general trend that the 
Russian Empire often expanded in the footprints of the Cossacks.  As those enterprising fugitives 
and criminals fled to the periphery of established Russian state control, they created living space 
by fire and blood.  As they moved outward, the Russian monarchs followed behind to fill the 
power vacuum left in their wake.  This process was often quite gradual.  The Greben Cossacks 
expanded into the Caucasus with almost a century between the founding of Tioumen stanitsa 
(Cossack village) and their Sounzha fort and their move to the north bank of the Terek River in 
1685.
33
  They were ultimately joined in this venture by the Terek Cossacks (terskie kozaki) in 
1712.  This geopolitical union of Cossack bands formed the prototype of what would ultimately 
grow into the Caucasian Line.
34
 
The first and most influential Emperor of All the Russias, Peter I The Great (r. 1682-
1725), oversaw this union and made the first official military forays into the Caucasus.  Though 
Peter spent much of his early life and the first years of his reign marginalized and largely 
shunned by his domineering half-sister Sophia Miloslavskaya and her puppet-Tsar younger 
brother Ivan V, he did not spend that time idly.  Instead, the industrious and talented young 
Romanov learned all he could about warfare.  This empirical curiosity led him to create Russia’s 
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famous imperial Life Guard regiments, its first navy, and reform the organization and training of 
Russia’s military from its antiquated medieval form into a contemporary, European-style army.35  
Peter’s involvement in the Caucasus was more instrumental than as a goal unto itself—it 
was not merely an imperial land grab. As historian and Peter biographer Robert Massie notes, the 
likely source of Peter’s desire to control the region was his interest in gaining a land route to the 
riches of India and South East Asia.  Peter sent a former “Circassian moslem,” General 
Alexander Bekovich Cherkassy, with 4000 troops to negotiate Russia’s annexation of the Khivan 
Khanate.
36
  Instead, General Cherkassy essentially invaded the khanate.  For this crime, the Khan 
of Khiva had Cherkassy killed, skinned, and stuffed to be displayed in his capitol.  Thus 
frustrated in his push southeast between the Caspian and Aral Seas by the Khan of Khiva’s 
duplicitous cunning, Peter had to look elsewhere along the Caspian littoral for an invasion 
point.
37
  A 1722 invasion of the northern Caucasus near Enderi during Peter’s Persian Campaign 
proved similarly unsuccessful. 
Ultimately, Peter’s greatest success in the Caucasus was his establishment of the Terek 
River as Russia’s southern border. He accomplished this with two tactics which would prove 
highly effective and imitable by later rulers: building forts to solidify control and advancing 
slowly by means of resettling Cossacks further and further into enemy territory.  By resettling 
and uniting Cossack bands to the region, he created the Terek Family Cossacks (tersko-
semeinie).  This union solidified the Russian presence in the region and allowed the two 
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composite Cossack armies (voiskas) to mutually support each other along the frontier.  Ten years 
after Peter’s death, Empress Anna constructed Russia’s Caucasian capitol, Kyzlyar Fortress, in 
1735 to hold and defend this border.
38
 
Aside from Anna’s contribution, the next big push into the region occurred under 
Catherine II the Great (r. 1762-1796).  Baddeley credits this push to Catherine’s desire to protect 
the rule of a Little Karbarda “princeling,” while Gammer reduces the motive to a pragmatic 
effort to make good on Russia’s claim to the Karbardan throne.  Regardless of the Empress’ 
motivations, imperial forces executed her will and constructed Mozdok Fortress.  This fort, 
whose name means “dense forest,” was turned into a major garrison by 1770 with the installment 
of 350 families of Don Cossacks.  Coupled with the resettlement of over 500 families of Volga 
Cossacks between the fort and the Greben Cossacks at the mouth of the Sounzha River, the 
Tsarina’s reinforcement greatly strengthened Russia’s presence in the region.  This was a move 
the Ottoman Empire could not ignore and Catherine was soon embroiled in the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1768-74. The indigenous population also contested this incursion, which led to a fourteen 
year conflict with the Kabartay—the clan to which Ivan IV wed the Russian throne—from 1765 
to 1779.
39
   
In order to effectively fight these simultaneous wars against the Kabartay and Ottomans, 
Catherine’s favorite at the time, General Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin-Tavricheski, 
solidified what became the Caucasian Line.  The Line was a string of Cossack settlements 
(stanitsi) and defensive forts stretching along Russia’s southern border and line of advance into 
the isthmus.  This main Line was completed with General Suvorov’s bloody dispatch of the 
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Nogay nomads, who killed their women and children and fought practically to the last man on 
learning that the Empress was resettling them outside their normal range.
40
  A secondary Kuban 
Line supported the first, and the two laid a “solid foundation” from which the empire would 
launch future assaults.
41
  Having left his mark on the region, Suvorov returned to Russia in 1784, 
and a year later Count Paul Potemkin was named the first Viceroy of the Caucasus. Potemkin 
strengthened the line by reinforcing Kyzlyar and Mozdok Fortresses and building his viceregal 
capitol, Ekaterinograd.   
Potemkin was also responsible for overseeing his cousin’s propaganda campaign against 
Sheikh Mansur and the Ghaznavat.  Mansur is still a poorly understood figure, his background 
remains largely a mystery and apart from his role in organizing Muslim resistance against the 
Russian conquest, little is known about this shadowy warrior.
42
  Mansur’s Ghaznavat was a holy 
war against the invading infidels and was the first concerted attempt at unifying resistance in the 
region.  Although Sheikh Mansur and his holy warriors achieved some measure of success and 
won several key battles, the movement ultimately proved unable to dislodge the Russians from 
the Caucasus.  Count Pavel Sergeevich Potemkin played no small part in limiting Mansur’s 
success, and his propaganda campaign was a part of this.  Gammer, citing Sharpudin Ahmadov, 
relates that the Viceroy distributed pamphlets ordering the mountaineers of Chechnya to disband 
and ignore the “false prophethood of this cheat.”  Utilizing such pejorative descriptors as: 
“cheat,” “tramp,” “rebel,” “savage,” and “wild beast,” these propaganda pamphlets established a 
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detrimental tradition of conceiving of the Caucasus’ inhabitants that survives to this day.43  
Although many of his policies set the groundwork for eventual Russian dominance in the region, 
he was dismissed in 1787 for his role in covering up the murder of a local nobleman seeking 
asylum at Kyzlyar and stealing his royal treasury.
44
 
Catherine’s death in 1796 led to the brief and largely ineffectual reign of her son, 
Emperor Paul I.  Likely sired by one of Catherine’s early favorites, Sergei Saltykov, Paul was the 
only “issue” of Catherine and her husband Emperor Peter III.  Paul was marginalized as an heir 
and future Emperor almost from the beginning.  As a child, the current Empress Elizabeth 
immediately separated him from his mother, and later he was kept at a distance as part of 
Catherine’s efforts to secure the throne for herself.  Though he was included in meetings of state 
before the birth of his sons, his integration into imperial politics proved brief.  Following his 
second marriage to Maria Fedorovna (née Sophia Dorothea of Württemberg) and the birth of 
their first son, the future Alexander I, Paul was again ignored by his mother in favor of his heir.  
This rejection and isolation must have infuriated and traumatized Paul, because on assuming the 
throne, he spent much of his five year reign reversing many of Catherine’s policies.45  
This general reversal of course from Catherine to Paul was reflected in the imperial 
policy in the Caucasus.  The Empress was on the verge of invading Persia via the Caucasus and 
continuing her aggressive expansionist policy, but Paul immediately halted the invasion and 
ordered the armies to return to Russia when she died suddenly of a stroke.  Baddeley notes that 
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along with the troop recall, Paul “put aside the galaxy of warriors and statesmen” who so ably 
assisted the Empress during her reign.  Many of these men would remain unutilized and 
essentially disfavored through the remainder of Paul’s brief rule.46 Unfortunately for Emperor 
Paul, his efforts to extricate Russia from foreign conflicts failed miserably.   
The turn of the 19
th
 century was not a good time for non-interventionist national politics.  
With Napoleon’s rise came a subsequent increase in the interconnectedness of European politics.  
Martial engagement proved no exception, and Paul’s Russia was increasingly drawn into foreign 
and global disputes.  Diplomacy and maneuvering between Russia and Europe’s other great 
powers of the time (France, England, and Prussia) led to a level of entanglement which Paul 
must have found frustrating.  Again, Russia’s macro politico-military trends also held true in the 
Caucasus.  Despite his interest in recalling the Persian invasion force and suspending expansion 
operations in the region, events forced Paul to a fateful decision 
On 30 December, 1800, King Georgi XII of Georgia and Emperor Paul I of Russia signed 
a manifesto officially annexing Georgia to the Russian Empire.  This act was the culmination of 
Russia’s Orthodox push into the Caucasus and perhaps the strongest basis on which later 
Emperors would act in the region.  The work began with Peter I in 1722 and his efforts to protect 
“the Christian Prince Vakhtang” and gain a foothold in the region via the Christian kingdom in 
Georgia.
47
 Catherine developed Russia’s protectorate role with the 24 July, 1783 Treaty of 
Georgievsk, in which Erekli II “acknowledged himself a vassal of Russia.”48  The process was 
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completed when Alexander I, Paul’s son and successor, confirmed his father’s acquisition in 
September, 1801.
49
 
 
That landscape[…] 
Where warlike raiders roam the hills 
And a wild imagination 
Lies in ambush in the empty silence. 
--Pushkin’s description of the Caucasus in his “Dedication to N.N. Rayevsky”50 
 
Susan Layton highlights an easily overlooked aspect of the Imperial war in the Caucasus: 
news of the conflict, details about casualties and costs, and details concerning the violence 
perpetrated in the name of conquest and civilization all remained state secrets.
51
  She notes that 
this phenomenon was especially pronounced in the 1820s when “[t]he total lack of anything 
approaching war correspondence” was allowed past the censors.  This “paucity” of real news 
carried through the 1820s until 1856 and Imam Shamil’s defeat.  Over the course of decades of 
warfare kept largely in the shadows of the public consciousness, literary informants grew ever 
more attractive to the growing reading public.
52
 Without an official voice informing them, the 
Russian people—at least those wealthy or educated—turned to the publications of veterans of the 
Caucasian campaigns as their primary sources of information.  
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 Although “fact-oriented writings” about the Caucasus its peoples were increasingly 
produced and disseminated over the course of the latter half of the 19
th
 century, many still 
selected literary depictions as their sources of information.  Layton notes that these texts were 
more entertaining, and such a trend occurred “just as common sense would predict.”53  That this 
trend conforms to common sense assumptions about a nation’s readership does not in any way 
detract from its fateful effects on the depictions of the war in the Caucasus or in how Russians 
perceived their enemies. Although Russia was alternately involved in any of several wars and 
conflicts throughout the early 19
th
 century, the imperial presence in the Caucasus was in many 
ways their most prolonged and involved venture.  As the other conflicts and tensions flared up 
and subsided over the first half of the 1800s, Russian officers and soldiers were consistently sent 
to the south in the seemingly unceasing conflict against the mountaineers.  It should not seem 
surprising then, that the Russian predilection for gaining familiarity with the Caucasus via 
literary, not scholarly, sources was “particularly pronounced.”54  This social trend problematized 
Russia’s efforts to “know” the Caucasus and was fateful in contributing to the trends examined 
in this thesis.   
 Aside from reasonable questions about the veracity of the content, it is also noteworthy 
how the level of Russian literacy altered and exacerbated the consequences of this trend.  As 
with many trappings of Western civilization, reading and education came late and gradually to 
tsarist Russia.  Popular legend states that Ivan the Terrible received Russia’s first printing press, 
but that it went largely unused because most feared it was an implement of the devil.  Under Tsar 
Alexis I, Russia saw its first privately operated printing press not under the direct control of the 
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Orthodox Church.  Like so many first attempts at reform, this venture failed. Patriarch Nikon, 
unhappy with the arrangement, tortured and killed the manager, Sylvester Medvedev, for 
banditry.  A 1682 decree similarly limited the distribution of folk literature by forbidding the 
publication or dissemination of any work containing religious themes penned by anyone other 
than the Church.
55
  Because Orthodoxy was such an integral aspect of the lives of the people and 
their literature, this effectively halted all non-Church publication.  Needless to say, such policies 
proved an insurmountable barrier to establishing any significant level of literacy in 17
th
 and 18
th
 
century Russia. 
Peter the Great was the first to seriously attempt the advance of education in his domain. 
He did so in part by severely limiting the powers of the Orthodox Church, especially over the 
monarch. In 1701 he issued a decree forbidding churchmen to “wield pen and ink.” He also 
wrested control of the printing presses from the church for state use.   By 1720, several printing 
presses were producing his 1708 layman grammars, geometry primers, calendars, histories and 
other secular works in addition to the traditional hagiographical and liturgical publications.  The 
number of books in print in Russia climbed from a paltry 8 in 1701 to 149 titles by 1724.
56
  Peter 
also founded the nation’s first newspaper, Vedomosti, which he designed to “keep his subjects 
abreast of the world” and first appeared in 1703.  The Reforming Tsar also established an open 
public theater to increase public awareness.
57
 This combination of mass information by spoken 
and written word proved enduring and helped shape 19
th
 century Russian impressions of the 
Caucasus. 
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 Peter’s establishment of the Table of Ranks and a merit-based system of mandatory 
government service for nobles was likely his most influential reform to affect Russian education 
and literacy.  Begun in 1712 and carried out intermittently from that date, these efforts to 
productively employ the children of landowners were met with stiff resistance from the 
staunchly conservative nobility.  Nevertheless, all sons of landowners were required to report for 
state service—military or bureaucratic—by the end of his reign.  This in turn necessitated the 
establishment of professional and preparatory academies and mandatory education for Russia’s 
elites.
58
  Despite the revolutionary sweep these efforts, education—and thus largely literacy as 
well—was often limited to the intellectually or financially gifted few to attend his academies. 
Among this select group of young men was poet, author, and iconoclast Alexander Sergeyevich 
Pushkin.   
Pushkin was born in Moscow on June 6, 1799 to Sergei Lvovich Pushkin and Nadezhda 
Osipovna (née Gannibal).
59
  Despite a famously poor relationship with his parents and lackluster 
childhood, Pushkin displayed an early penchant for writing.  In 1811 Tsar Alexander founded the 
Lycée, an elite preparatory school in Tsarskoe Selo, which offered a peerless, 6 year education 
for talented young nobles.  Pushkin was accepted in the inaugural class, and though he displayed 
obvious talent, his instructors did not hold high hopes for his future productivity.  After his 
graduation in 1817 he was made a collegiate assessor (10
th
 on the Table of Ranks).  In this role, 
Pushkin seemed to bear out his professors’ fears and accomplished little as a bureaucrat.  This 
was not the case with his writing; Pushkin produced Ruslan and Liudmilla and numerous shorter 
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poems.  Unfortunately for the young, carefree poet, he lacked the prudence and practiced self-
censorship vital to Russian authors.  Unable to keep his political and ideological opinions out of 
his work and following the wide popular reception of several such radical poems (e.g. “Ode to 
Liberty,” “To Chaadayev,” and “The Country”), Pushkin finally drew the Tsar’s ire. 
Pushkin’s literary daring earned him a sentence to internal exile.  Though Tsar Alexander 
originally considered Siberia or Solovki, influential friends interceded on his behalf and the poet 
was sent to the Caucasus and Crimea instead.  Susan Layton notes in her introduction to Russian 
Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy that by this time 
(1820), the Caucasus had earned the moniker “the southern Siberia” for its prominent utility as a 
point of exile for those fallen from official grace.  Pushkin ultimately served three years of exile 
in the south before being transferred to Odessa and then, a year later, to house arrest in Pskov.   
He would not be the last of Russia’s literary greats to serve such a sentence in the south. 
Pushkin’s “The Prisoner of the Caucasus” (Kavkavsky Plennik) was the seminal work in 
the field of Romantic depictions of Russia in the Caucasus. First published in 1821-1822, this 
epic poem “created a literary vogue” in Russia.  Falling firmly within the Russian romantic 
tradition, “Prisoner” details the travails of a Russian officer who left home and court in a state of 
jaded, dejected ennui.  After his capture by “Circassians,” the prisoner observes the harsh, 
independent life his captors lead.  A girl from the village falls in love with and ultimately frees 
the prisoner, but because of his rejection of her offers to elope, she drowns in the river across 
which the prisoner escapes.
60
  Its adulation for thematic elements like captivating scenery, a 
sense of almost primal freedom, and lovely, tragic heroines attracted audiences to the beauty of 
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the Caucasus even as his depictions of male violence titillated the Russian aristocratic 
imagination.
61
 
Interestingly, this initial work did not solely engender characterizations of Caucasian 
peoples as barbarians in Russia’s popular imagination.  In spite of their violence, Pushkin’s 
mountaineers and his depictions of the breathtaking, rugged scenery instead romanticized the 
region and its peoples.  Layton summarizes the reputation the tribes acquired through Pushkin’s 
descriptions in terms of “martial heroism, charming folklore, a pleasingly ‘simple way of life,’ 
and generosity within their own communities.”62 Still, “The Prisoner of the Caucasus” 
established clear and entrenched precedence for depictions of Caucasian violence.  This work, 
and those that followed in the tradition of writing about one’s Caucasian experience, enshrined 
the mountaineer’s martial potential in the Russian popular imagination.  
Pushkin begins the narrative portion of his poem imagining the conversation of a group 
of Circassians, which wistfully recounts:  
The raids when they carried all before them, the tricks their clever chieftains used to play, the 
vicious thrusts their swords delivered, their deadly aim as marksmen, the villages they burned to 
ashes, and the gentle touch of the dark-eyed girls they took captive.
63
 
This expository passage effectively summarizes the male experience in the Caucasus as Pushkin 
perceived it.  These “menfolk…sitting at ease in their doorways” are not engaged in any form of 
productive labor recognizable as such to Russian audiences.
64
  Rather, they reminisce about 
victories past and the pleasure they found in the commission of violence. Their fond musings 
evoke thoughts of blood, smoke, and conquest. These are not men of peaceful means, but are 
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immediately depicted as a people who live by war.  This passage sets the tone for the remainder 
of the poem.   
For Pushkin, the martial character of his subjects was also in evidence during their 
celebrations.  He describes the games held on feast days as starting peacefully enough: 
But men that are born for war get tired of the monotony of peacetime, and often they mar the 
sporting activities of their freedom and leisure with crueler sports. Sometimes in the wild 
exuberance of Circassian festivities there’ll be a menacing flash of swords, and the heads of slaves 
will tumble to the dust to the youngsters’ rapturous applause.65 
Everyone—from the men gleefully slaughtering slaves to the children observing the spectacle—
enjoys the display of violence in this scene.  That celebrations on holy days could so organically 
incorporate death seemingly left its mark on Pushkin even as his depiction would have marked 
the imaginations of his readers. 
Pushkin reinforces this fearsome, martial characterization later when he describes a 
typical Circassian man as being “festooned with weaponry; he takes pride and comfort in it. He 
carries a harness, a hand gun, a quiver, a Kuban-style bow, a lasso, a dagger, and a sabre—which 
he constantly keeps by him at work and at leisure.
66
 This description explicitly delineates the 
many tools that made Circassians deadly enemies.  The array of weapons, kept constantly at 
hand, became extensions of mountaineers’ bodies.  Pushkin implies that such destructive 
weapons were the tools of the Circassian’s trade, and like any skilled craftsman, he was the 
master of each of his tools. 
 The poet also immortalized the instrumental utility of Caucasian horses.  Following his 
impressive list of Circassian weapons, Pushkin noted that a mountaineer’s prized possession “is 
his mettlesome horse, reared among mountain herds, a terror to easy-going [C]ossacks, but to 
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him a loyal, longsuffering companion.”67  On one hand, this passage would likely have struck a 
chord with his readers on the virtue of the horse’s overwhelming and inimical status to the 
famously stalwart and hearty Cossacks alone.  That Circassian horses—without their well-armed 
riders—could inspire such an emotion in Russia’s border guards would have strongly reinforced 
the fearsome reputations of the men who could tame such “terrors.”   
But Pushkin did not simply leave it to his readers to imagine Caucasian facility at 
horsemanship.  His prisoner recalls watching for hours as a mounted Circassian rode “leaning 
forward in the saddle, his agile legs pressing down on the stirrups, at one with his steed, 
practicing early for war.”68  This passage explicitly connected man to horse, and then again that 
deadly amalgam to war.  By so thoroughly blending these three elements, Pushkin effectively 
and fatefully linked the Caucasian mountaineer to conflict. He reinforced this notion when the 
men of the village prepare for a raid.  The prisoner describes how: 
The saddled horses seethed; all the men of the village were ready to go raiding; and the fierce 
horde of born fighters steamed down from the hills like a river and galloped along the banks of the 
Kuban to exact the rewards of violence.
69
    
Again, Pushkin blends rider and steed, and together, they comprise a “seething horde” with 
deadly aim. Individually capable of striking in an instant and dragging a bleeding, doomed 
captive away, the horsemen of Pushkin’s poem were a truly fearsome fighting force when 
banded together on a raid.  Even the Russian audience safely isolated from the Caucasian front in 
Russia’s interior who read “Prisoner” must have known a moment of terror at reading this.  One 
can only imagine the increased effect such depictions had on soldiers and officers leaving the 
relative comfort of the empire’s core for military service on its turbulent periphery. 
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 In the final layer of creating “the Circassian,” Pushkin describes the tactical chicanery 
that made the mountaineers so infamous. Following his recital of how a djigit—skilled and 
versatile fighters—might capture slaves by virtue of their superior skill with horse and lasso, 
Pushkin offers another reason to fear the raiders: their unique and determined capacity for silent 
murder.  The author describes a Circassian using river flotsam to disguise his crossing of the 
river and approach to the line of wary, but nevertheless doomed Cossack guards.  Though the 
unnamed Cossack victim is awake, on post, and vigilantly watching (in the right direction) for 
the Circassians to attack, the mountaineer rides the log in the current, cloaked in the darkness of 
night and his black equipment, and silently shoots his enemy from midstream.
70
 Though they had 
superior numbers, fortifications, a stronger position with firm ground, and the knowledge that 
attack from the river was all but a matter of time, the Cossacks in this poem almost seem to lose 
inevitably.  Russian numerical and logistical superiority are rendered meretricious and 
ineffective by the superiority of the djigit’s tactical subterfuge and almost inhuman ability to 
strike anywhere and at any time.   
 Taken together, the various martial elements included in Pushkin’s “Prisoner of the 
Caucasus” paint a frightening picture of Caucasian mountaineers.  He regales his readers with 
descriptions of talented, dedicated fighters literally “born for war.”  These men knew the 
mountains, rivers, and forests of the Caucasus as the foreign invaders never would; even the 
Cossacks, who had lived for generations in close proximity to Pushkin’s “Circassians,” were 
incapable of out-mountaineering the mountaineers in their home terrain.  Then there were the 
weapons.  Each raider carried a personal arsenal of both long and short range weapons and was 
intimately familiar and inimitably deadly with each.  Armed to the teeth, a djigit could fight to 
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the death without fear of running out of ammunition or of breaking a blade and suddenly finding 
himself unarmed.  When one weapon was rendered unusable, the Circassian could carry on his 
violent mission with any of a number of equally deadly implements, and all of this while borne 
by a steed so wild, even born-in-the-saddle Cossacks found them to be “mettlesome…terror[s].”  
Like the weapons, there was a distinct blend between man and horse, and the resulting 
combination made for a dangerous enemy.  Pushkin completed this portrait and immortalized the 
Circassian raider in the Russian imagination with his depiction of mountaineer trickery.  Their 
tactics rendered them invisible monsters attacking from the darkness and leaving no trace of their 
presence but the fallen Cossack and bloodied guard post.
71
  In the face of such a seemingly 
indomitable opponent, Russians leaving for service in the Caucasus after 1822 and the 
publication of “Prisoner” did so with a certain amount of anxiety. 
It is this anxiety, instilled and reinforced by their conceptions of the enemy, helped 
inspire Russian fighting men to conceive of and commit their own stunningly violent, destructive 
acts.  Service as a soldier, or worse, as a Cossack on the Line, must have seemed a hopeless, 
demoralizing duty.  Leading these men in this task likely proved a challenge altogether different 
and far more daunting from the great patriotic effort to repulse Napoleon’s Grande Armée a 
scant decade earlier.  From this perspective, the motivation to find and implement their own 
extreme measures, to respond in kind, seems at least understandable.  Pushkin’s writings were 
not the only source to influence policy and leadership in the Caucasus, but the popularity of his 
work among the upper class—from whence the Russian officer corps was drawn—no doubt 
instilled the author’s impressions of the place and peoples in generations of young men who 
would later serve in these rugged environs.  It seems unlikely that such inculcated notions would 
                                                          
71
 Ibid. 
Lawrence Myers THESIS Prof. Shneer 
33 
 
not later shape how these men conceived of their enemies in the immediacy and heat of war.  It is 
this assumption that this thesis seeks to support by finding the presence of such characterizations 
of the Caucasus and its peoples and connecting them with the decisions made about the war. 
Another manner in which Pushkin’s seminal work shaped Russian conceptions of the 
peoples of the south was the way the author labeled his subjects.  Layton relates that “The 
Prisoner” first popularized the term “Circassian” as one that “Russians applied to all Caucasian 
mountaineers.”  He opens the body of the poem with the setting, Circassia, and quickly begins 
blending that name with the broader context of the Caucasus, the birthplace of the men in this 
opening scene.  The next time these men are named in the text, they appear not as men “born and 
bred in the Caucasus,” but as Circassians.72  
In a similar vein, Pushkin, and thus popular convention, used the terms Circassian and 
Chechen almost “interchangeably.”  Layton points out that in a later work and personal 
correspondences following the publication of “Prisoner of the Caucasus,” Pushkin continued to 
use the word “Circassian” as an “all-purpose name.”73 In “Prisoner,” Pushkin demonstrates this 
interchangeability most clearly with “The Circassian Song,” in which the label in the title 
presumably equates to and references the “Chechen” who appears in the stanzas of the song.74 
This habit of language was inherently detrimental to gaining true familiarity with the subjects in 
question and understanding them as individuals or distinct groups.  Portraying a heterogeneous 
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plurality in terms of a monolithic, homogenized singularity obscured the differences, thoughts, 
personalities, and capabilities of the composite parts.
75
 
Perhaps the most general and insidious label used to describe the various peoples of the 
isthmus was the term “Asiatic” or “Oriental.”  This label was attractive precisely because of the 
entrenched use of the term in other authorship, especially works by prominent, non-Russian 
Romantic authors.
76
  The term facilitated discussion of the peoples of  the Caucasus not only by 
grouping them under a single heading, but also throwing them in with the pool of “others” 
elsewhere along Russia’s southern and eastern borders.  Layton points out that Russian authors 
used “Asiatic” in diametrical opposition to depictions of their “[E]uropeanized self.”  Tellingly, 
she describes both in terms of invention, implying that in neither instance was the chosen label 
accurate or appropriate for describing Russia.
77
 Even more so than the geographically precise 
derivative names like Caucasian or Circassian, naming their enemies as “Asiatics” obscured any 
individual identity beneath the reputation associated with the label.  Moreover, this language 
established a binary discourse in which Russian and Asiatic could just have easily been replaced 
by Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, or Civilized and Savage.
78
  Simply put, this established a 
mindset of svoi versus chuzhoi: self versus the other. 
Another manifestation of this binary discourse was the distinction made between the 
“pacified” peoples of the Caucasus (those who lived under Russian suzerainty) and the 
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“mountaineers,” or those who continued to fight and resist Russian dominion.  Russian authors 
and commanders writing about the groups in the region often discussed the people in terms of 
their relationship to Russia, and the most fundamental aspect of any of these relationships was 
whether or not the men of that group would kill them given the chance.  To demarcate those 
thought to be safe, Russians used the term “pacified.” Although such a label axiomatically marks 
a group as peaceful, the term is also derivative from the “pacification” campaigns—really 
retaliatory or “softening” raids—conducted against powerful or recalcitrant auls (villages).79  
This binary in particular obscures the subjects and the conditions under which the 
differentiation occurred.    Some of the so-called “pacified” groups accepted the Russian 
presence voluntarily and welcomed their influence in the region.  Georgia was annexed in 1801.  
On a smaller scale, groups like the Ossetes (sometimes, Ossetians) accepted Russian suzerainty 
as a band of people rather than a state.
80
  These groups often lived in the Northern Caucasus, 
were Christian or even Orthodox, and were long accustomed to Cossack bands and the presence 
of the empire.  Others among the “pacified” were conquered groups, the products of imperial 
pacification campaigns and more appropriately labeled as such.  Russian officers and officials 
forced these groups into submission, either by military force, economic pressure, or a 
combination of the two.   
Applying the common label “pacified” to these two demographic groups also erased the 
agency, choices, and histories that made them distinct peoples.  Especially in light of Tsar 
Nicholas’ emphasis on Orthodoxy as the identity of good Russian subjects, the Georgians, 
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Ossetes, and other Christian/Orthodox subjects must have resented being grouped with 
conquered recalcitrants.  Conversely, for the traumatized survivors of Russian pacifying 
campaigns—essentially conquered peoples—living under the Empire’s heel alongside willing 
collaborators would have been a terrible insult and a source of constant tension. Vengeance and 
personal honor were such integral aspects of individual identity to many groups at this time, 
which would likely have exacerbated these tensions.  Similarly, naming a group “mountaineers” 
(i.e. resistors) obscured individual motivation and agency between groups.  Some resisted for 
reasons of faith, some for economic reasons, some for culture, some out of pressure from peers 
or neighboring bands, but whatever their reasons, these djigiti were prepared to offer their lives 
in pursuit of them.  Granted, it was far simpler to discuss the various enclaves resisting the tsar’s 
armies in terms of a monolithic or heterogeneous whole.  This ease also facilitated the use of 
orientalist and pejorative dichotomies that justified and helped drive the conquest. 
Such pejorative and dehumanizing labeling is often some of the most striking and 
noticeable orientalist language in period sources—and also some of the most deleterious.  The 
most blatant and seemingly oft imitated example is his characterization of a Circassian lying in 
ambush as a “wily brigand.”81 This moniker proved broadly detrimental to positive, equitable 
discourse about the region’s inhabitants.  Although in this instance the man described is actually 
engaged in well-conceived criminal activity, the characterization is still problematic for the 
precedent it set and for its seemingly representative nature.  That this “wily brigand” serves as 
Pushkin’s paragon of being Circassian established a tangibly definitive quality. Following the 
publication of “Prisoner of the Caucasus,” to be Circassian was to be a cunning criminal. There 
was little room under this paradigm for compassion, love, fear or any other actions or emotions 
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that otherwise define the human experience.  Thus safely and comfortably compartmentalized 
under an umbrella name, the people of the Caucasus gained a monolithic reputation, indivisible 
and universally applied to all members, regardless of actual, individual identity. Like eponymous 
Mount Caucus, which lent its name to the people, mountains, and region that surrounded it, the 
peoples of the region lost their individuality in the great sweep of being “Circassian.”82 
Beyond the immediate scope of his poem’s effects on Russia’s popular imagination, 
“Prisoner of the Caucasus” established a clear precedent for debasing Caucasian peoples.  There 
is a discernible trend among later works in which authors writing about the Caucasus’ inhabitants 
seem at times almost incapable of leaving a name unmodified by some pejorative, or at the very 
least titillating, descriptor.  Such authorship could have taken shape out of “common sense” and 
economic interests. Bloody criminals made (and still make) for exciting subjects to capture 
popular attention.  Moreover, such debased foci naturally fit in with the romantic norms so 
prevalent at the time.  Romanticism’s anti-heroes turned convention on its head in lionizing 
otherwise despicable characters in popular literature.  Bad men behaving selfishly or basely drew 
admiration from the romantic audience—“wily brigands” did not fall too far from this standard.  
Another possible explanation for this trend was that portraying their enemies in such a 
clearly negative light simplified the inherently complex war.  Had Pushkin’s sympathy and 
respect for the plight of the peoples he described been more pronounced and characterized his 
authorship, Russian audiences would have had to face more intimately the difficult realities of 
the war.  Russia, not the Caucasus, was the aggressor in this conflict, and their imperial 
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expansion came at a high cost.  By positioning his country against bands of “wily brigands,” 
Pushkin obscured this fact and made discussing the war morally palatable and entertaining. 
Following his second term of internal exile and several bouts of serious illness, a battered 
Pushkin finally sought refuge in matrimony. On May 6, 1830 his engagement to Natalia 
Goncharova was announced, and on February 18, 1831 the two were married.  Due to a cholera 
outbreak in St. Petersburg, the Imperial Court moved to the Pushkins’ new home town in 
Tsarskoe Selo.  In this way Natalia’s beauty became known in court circles—even Tsar Nicholas  
grew enamored of her.  In 1833 Nicholas promoted a surprised and suspicious Pushkin to the 
rank of Kammerjunker in what the poet perceived as an attempt to keep Natalia ensconced in 
society functions and near to her adoring male courtiers.  Among these admirers was George 
D’Anthés, a member of the Imperial Horse Guards, royalist French émigré to Russia, possible 
homosexual partner with his adopted “father,” the Dutch ambassador to Russia, Baron van 
Heeckeren, and an extraordinarily wealthy playboy.  D’Anthés openly pursued Goncharova, and 
rumors soon grew around the pair.  Affairs reached such a state that Pushkin wrote an 
intentionally incendiary letter to D’Anthés’ father, which provoked the expected duel with the 
son.  On January 27, 1837 D’Anthés shot Pushkin from ten paces, delivering a fatal blow.  Two 
days later, Russia lost its greatest poet.
83
 
The next author of note to write in the Caucasian experience tradition was also the first 
who served a military role there.  Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bestuzhev (1797-1837) was 
groomed for military service from a young age, and in the reign of Alexander I he attained the 
rank of Staff-Captain in the Life Guards Dragoons.  His progress through the ranks halted in 
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1825 when he was sent to Yakutsk for participating in a conspiracy connected with the 
Decembrist Revolt that was Nicholas’ bloody inauguration to the throne.  Four years later, 
Bestuzhev was sent to the Caucasus as a common soldier, where he served with distinction in 
numerous engagements and ultimately died in a mountaineer ambush in the forests near Adler 
Cape in 1837.  Although he published numerous works throughout his career under the Nome de 
plume Marlinsky, “Ammalat Bek” (1831) was one of his first after the 1825 debacle and his exile 
to the Caucasus.
84
 Despite the decade between publication dates, Marlinsky’s Caucasian tale 
follows almost seamlessly with Pushkin’s seminal creation.85 
Like Pushkin before him, Marlinsky paid close attention to describing the raiment and 
weaponry of his Dagestani subjects.  The author paints Ammalat Bek, nephew of the Shamkhal 
of Tarki, in vivid detail for his readers, relating the vitality of his youth, the richness of his garb, 
and the threatening incorporation of utilitarian martial accoutrements in place of more decorative 
royal possessions.  Included in the impressive list of his wealth are a gun [musket], dagger, 
pistol, and saber.
86
  Though well dressed and comfortable in his wealth under Russian suzerainty, 
Ammalat Bek is still the paragon of the djigit. He proves this fact when he interrupts the games 
over which he is presiding to demonstrate with focused intensity and technical perfection the 
peak of a djigit’s skill.87  The Shamkhal’s nephew is talented in the arts of war, but the reader is 
immediately given cause to remember that his demonstration is still just a game with the 
introduction of another archetypal character. 
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Marlinsky’s Sultan Akhmet Khan of Avar is rendered as a more deadly, serious, and 
purposeful type of djigit than the wealthy dandy Ammalat Bek.
88
  Where Ammalat Bek is clean 
and brightly colorful, his garb etched in gold and silver decorations, and his “bright bay steed… 
[frets] like a whirlwind,” the Sultan and his entourage ride up in “dusty dress” on foam covered 
horses.  The Sultan wears a linked-mail shirt, a helmet, and is garbed in “full warlike 
equipment.”89  Taken together, Marlinsky’s descriptions of Akhmet Khan portray a man 
unconcerned with worldly wealth or comfort.  His focus, talents, and person—the same martial 
skill that makes him and Ammalat Bek djigiti—are all directed at resisting the Russians.  The 
author bolsters this reading when the Sultan defiantly rides through the stacked muskets of the 
Russian Army company, admits his responsibility for an infamous ambush at Bashli, and having 
cajoled the sullen on looking Dagestanis to fight with the company of dragoons, leaves two of 
his cohort to “keep alive the violent spirit among the Tatars.”90  Gone are the horsemanship and 
weaponry displays for enjoyment and celebration.  His actions are all business. 
This descriptive dichotomy is not Marlinsky’s last depiction of Dagestani violence. 
Having instigated a battle between the people of Bouinaki and the Russian dragoons and fatally 
wounded the dragoon Captain, Akhmet Khan convinces Ammalat Bek to flee with him into the 
mountains of Avaria to escape prosecution and fight in the resistance.  The fiery Sultan urges 
Ammalat to “justify himself” to the Russians “[w]ith lead and steel…The firing is begun….the 
sword is drawn.”91 Later, as the wounded Ammalat Bek and his mentor travel to the Avar khan’s 
village, they are met on the road by another horseman.  Though the words of their greeting are 
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cordial and according to custom, “[s]alam aleikom….aleikom [s]alam,” the strange rider is 
veiled for battle with his gun cocked while the Sultan’s party is similarly prepared for violence.92  
These passages clearly portray the people of Dagestan as a generally violent race, and even more 
explicitly, the mountaineers of Dagestan as an especially terrifying force.   In what was likely an 
under-perceived bit of irony among 19
th
 century Russian readers, this greeting delivered with 
such a tense undercurrent wishes peace to each speaker.  
Perhaps most frightening of all to Marlinsky’s readers was the implication that this 
violent nature was somehow communicable or inspirational to the peoples of the Caucasus. 
Marlinsky follows orientalist convention in portraying Sultan Akhmet Khan as savagely violent, 
and it is in this savagery that Akhmet Khan converts Ammalat Bek from a pacified ruler into his 
violent double.  Marlinsky prepares his readers for Sultans evangelical role when Akhmet Khan 
explains to the weary Ammalat Bek that one day: 
Time will pass, tears will dry up; the thirst of vengeance will take place of grief for the dead; and 
then again Sultan Akhmet will be seen the prophet of plunder and of blood….I shall once more 
lead flying bands of avengers into the Russian limits.
93
 
That this declaration comes from a Tatar likely rendered the Sultan’s claim to being a prophet all 
the more terrifying and realistic to Russian Orthodox readers. During the reign reactionary of 
Tsar Nicholas I, Orthodoxy was intrinsically tied to national identity and the prevailing notions 
of responsible citizenship.  That Marlinsky in many ways couched his epic struggle in terms of 
Muslim versus Orthodox would have made the stakes personal and high for his aristocratic 
audience.  Though most would likely never serve in the Caucasus, this text put their very 
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identities on the line and rendered all of literate, Orthodox Russia as philosophical co-combatants 
in the ideological struggle.
94
  
Later, when Ammalat Bek pleads with Akhmet Khan to let him die on the mountain, the 
Sultan stirs the young man’s spirit and revives him with the reminder that “[r]evenge on the 
Russians is a holy duty.”  Henceforth, the young nephew of the Shamkhal pledges to “live for 
revenge” and strike as the Sultan would direct him.95 This development would have seemed 
especially terrifying for those officers and policy makers responsible for conquering the 
Caucasus.  A central element of the imperial strategy in the region was to coopt indigenous rulers 
and populations with bribes of wealth and position.  Thus converted, those leaders and groups 
would weaken in their indolent wealth, cease to actively resist the Russian advance, and become 
further isolated from their less venal neighbors.
96
 Marlinsky references this strategy explicitly 
when Sultan Akhmet Khan first encounters the dragoons and cries: “Away, brute….I am a 
Russian general.
97
  Before he stabs the dragoon Captain, he claims that the “Russian padisha 
gave me rank.”98 By implication, Akhmet Khan is one of the many resistors the Russians bought 
out of the conflict.  To see such a supposedly coopted, “pacified” personage break with his vows 
to sow death and disorder among a Russian unit called into question the efficacy of the bribery 
campaign.  What was worse, this failed convert instead turned a previously subdued ruler into a 
lifelong enemy of the Tsar.  Ultimately, this interaction had implications beyond one specific 
relationship and spoke to the tenuous nature of Russian dominance in the region.   
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Marlinsky also reproduces the fundamental dichotomy of orientalist discourse in the 
contrast of dirty versus clean, untried versus world weary, and exhibitionism versus grim utility.  
In Chapter I, Ammalat Bek represents the bright and good in the Caucasus, while Akhmet Khan 
serves as his foil: a dark, violent, uncontrollable force.  Although in this depiction Marlinsky 
contrasts two indigenous populations, rather than the West/East or Russian/Caucasian 
comparison one might expect of conventional orientalist discourse, the difference between the 
more and less civilized archetypes is obvious and fateful.  The most striking arena in which 
Marlinsky accomplishes this division is in his portrayal of pacified and non-pacified Dagestanis.  
Marlinsky separates civilized from primitive by differentiating between pacified 
Caucasian peoples and those who still resisted the empire’s efforts at conquest.  The pacified 
Ammalat Bek retains those aspects of his culture that the romantic Russian imagination admired 
and valued: his freedom, martial prowess, and intimacy with the wild lands of the Caucasus.  His 
favorable standing with the women gathered to observe the holiday demonstrations even receives 
attention from Marlinsky as the author carefully crafts an archetypal portrayal of his idea of a 
Circassian.
99
  It is only by contrasting Ammalat Bek with Sultan Akhmet Khan that the 
Shamkhal’s nephew initially appears as an imposter djigit, capable of many of the same feats but 
untested and uninterested in real battle.   
Ammalat Bek does not play this role for long.  In Chapter II, the Shamkhal’s nephew 
sheds his shell of indolent, youthful passivity and is born again, in the violent crucible of battle, 
as a warrior worthy of the “blood of the Emirs” and wholly dedicated to revenge against the 
Russians.
100
  That this metamorphosis from civilized to savage is accompanied by violence, 
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bloodshed, and flight to the mountains is no coincidence.  Marlinsky draws a clear line between 
those who live under the Russian boot and those who resist, and those dedicated to resisting 
Russia’s civilizing efforts must themselves be inherently uncivilized.  Although the dragoons 
organize and retaliate, scattering the village and killing “hundreds of brave mountaineers” in the 
process, their violence is at best an afterthought in Marlinsky’s account.101  Djigit violence, no 
matter its relative impotence when compared to the mass destruction we learn the Russians 
wreak as the men flee, is the only violence in which Marlinsky is interested.  By extension, 
Russian audiences too would have had little desire for exposure to the brutality of their own 
troops.  More acceptable to their sense of moral self-importance by far, mythologized Caucasian 
violence supported their notions of a need to civilize the region at any cost.  Moreover, such 
depictions made for titillating reading, which in turn further entrenched asymmetrical 
examination and justification of violence during the war.  
Ammalat Bek and Akhmet Khan’s escape from the village to Avaria also mimics the 
divide between civilized and primitive in portraying the archetypal djigit flight into the 
mountains.  After stabbing the dragoon captain and hearing that the Russians were attacking, 
Akhmet Khan exhorts his host to return with him to his home settlement.
102
  On arriving at a 
mountaintop overlooking the village, the men hear musket shots from an inter-village conflict.  
Akhmet Khan explains to the nonplussed Ammalat Bek that “[w]ith us, these are everyday 
affairs….[s]uch skirmishes cherish among us a warlike spirit and warlike habits.” Akhmet Khan 
even notes the “coolness of the women” as musket balls flew all around them.103  
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These passages demonstrate the perception that the ontology of violence increases along 
with the elevation of the setting even as the level of civilization decreases.  That the Sultan’s 
people wage open war over a “private quarrel” or the theft of a cow seems to be Marlinsky’s 
ultimate proof of their savagery.  Even the transformed Ammalat Bek seems taken aback at this 
insensate violence.  It resembles a game, with one side cheering as a member of the opposite is 
carried away in defeat, but unlike the holiday demonstrations from which Ammalat Bek and the 
Sultan fled previously, this was real violence, perpetrated against real “adversaries.”  Such 
behavior almost unavoidably evokes comparison to animals falling on a carcass or fighting for 
scraps of food.  It is the ultimate condemnation of the region’s peoples, and for Marlinsky’s 
audience, the fundamental reason the empire should press into the region.    
Much like Marlinsky before him, Mikhail Iurevich Lermontov (1814-1841) got his start 
in the military in the Life Guards Regiment.  In 1834, the year he received his commission as an 
officer in the Life Guards Hussars, he also made his first attempt at prose writing.  This 
connection between Lermontov’s creative production and his service to the state would continue 
throughout his career and lamentably short life.  Between 1834 and 1837, the wealthy young 
socialite served and wrote primarily in St. Petersburg.  This interlude was interrupted in 1837 
when Lermontov wrote “Death of a Poet,” an apologia and eulogy for Pushkin, who died in 
January of that year.
104
  This poem so incensed Tsar Nicholas and the censors for its 
condemnation of the aristocracy (Lermontov dubbed them the “greedy hordes around the 
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throne,” “killers of freedom,” and “corruption’s friends”) that Lermontov was arrested and 
transferred to a dragoon regiment stationed in the Caucasus.
105
 
Lermontov’s time in the Caucasus ended in 1838 after his aunt secured his pardon and a 
retransfer back to St. Petersburg.  Though of limited duration, his travels along “the whole length 
of the Line, from Kizlyar to Taman” left quite an impression on the young creative, and he began 
work on A Hero of Our Time.
106
 Two years later, in 1840, Lermontov engaged in a duel by 
sword with the son of the French Ambassador to Russia and was again transferred to a Caucasian 
regiment.  This second term of exile to the south saw Lermontov’s first real experiences in 
combat, and the author was twice recommended by superiors and twice denied by the Tsar for 
valorous commendations.  These experiences provided the inspiration for his poem “Valerik,” a 
reflection of his experience in a bloody battle that took place near the river of that name.
107
  On 
15 July, 1841, Lermontov died in a duel against an acquaintance from the military academy in 
Piatigorsk.  That same summer, the second edition—complete with the Author’s Preface—of A 
Hero of Our Time was published.  His most famous poem, “The Demon,” was also published 
posthumously.  As with Marlinsky and Pushkin, there is a decade between the publication dates 
of Lermontov and Marlinsky’s major works.  This gap does not prevent Lermontov’s poems and 
prose from fitting firmly within the established framework and precedent of Caucasian tales. 
Lermontov was the epitome of a generation of youth who grew up enchanted by a 
constructed image of the Caucasus and its peoples.  His earlier works were inspired by the poems 
and literature he read as a young noble and drew inspiration from his first period of exile.  Both 
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the story “Bela” and the poem “The Demon” were written in the 1830s and the editions  
analyzed in this thesis were not published until the year of his death.  “The Demon” in particular 
was a life-long labor of love inspired in part by the poet’s fascination with Pushkin and his 
“Prisoner of the Caucasus.”108  “Bela” too drew inspiration from the literary tradition of the 
Caucasian tale, but Lermontov’s own experience traveling through the region as an officer in 
exile helped shape that story as well.
109
  These works periodically mimic the literary vogue in 
depicting Caucasian peoples as violent and uncivilized—“Bela” especially displays the fiery 
djigit prominently—but Lermontov also contributed to the corpus of 19th century literature about 
the Caucasus with his expansion and entrenchment of perceptions about women and alcohol.    
Lermontov begins “Bela” by establishing the authority and authenticity of Maxim 
Maximych, the tale’s Caucasian War expert.  Captain Maxim Maximych is portrayed as an older 
officer of “about fifty” with a “swarthy expression.”  In response to an apartently naïve question 
from the narrator, Maxim wryly remarks, “[y]ou won’t have been long in the Caucasus?”110  This 
scene takes place before readers move on to Maximych’s recollections of his time with Pechorin 
or the latter’s diary entries from “Taman” or the Piatigorsk spa tale, “Princess Mary.”  In short, 
this meeting and Lermontov’s depiction of Maximych lead the book’s exposition and precede all 
action.  The author carefully constructs Maximych’s identity as the narrator’s (and reader’s) 
guide to the Caucasus.  His age, sun-burnt skin, rank, and apparent success in dealing with the 
mountain carters all assert that he knows his way around the land and people.   
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Another aspect of establishing Maximych’s authority comes in his role as a foil to the 
inexperienced narrator.  The epistemological superiority of the Captain’s knowledge is 
demonstrated by his riding in a fully loaded cart pulled effectively by two pairs of oxen and 
laughs when the narrator of the tales asks why his much lighter cart—pulled by six oxen and a 
team of Ossete carters—is moving so slowly and laboriously up the steep mountain path.111 The 
narrator’s year traversing the region has ill prepared him for even the vagaries of travel.  Readers 
are left to imagine on their own how less capable he must be of surviving battle.  Maximych, on 
the other hand, has demonstrated his superior experience and the consequences thereof not only 
by hiring the right number of oxen and carters, but also implicitly by surviving to his current age 
and position.   
This dichotomy between the young narrator and experienced veteran adds an instructive 
element and chilling realism to the story.  The narrator presumably is one of dozens of young 
noblemen traveling to the Caucasus for service in the army.  Many readers drew comparisons 
between Lermontov and the characters in his novel, a fact the author had to acknowledge in his 
“Author’s Preface” to the second edition of A Hero of Our Time.112  Whether the narrator (or 
later, Pechorin) specifically represents Lermontov is irrelevant to this thesis.  These characters all 
clearly portray the archetype of the young Russian officer, and like Lermontov before them, an 
entire generation of Russian aristocrats read his works for a glimpse into their future.  His stories 
did not just entertain bored courtiers and provide a brief respite from their affluent ennui, they 
instructed future officers about the “truth” of the Caucasus and taught them how to perceive and 
deal with the land and its peoples.  
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In “Bela,” Captain Maxim Maximych continues his role as experienced guide and 
informant and immediately berates and insults the various demographic groups living in the 
region.  Maximych explains to the narrator that his carter problems derive from the carters’ very 
nature: “fearful rogues, these Asiatics are….dreadful scoundrels….[t]hey like to fleece 
travelers.” He rounds out the epithets and succinctly labels the Ossete carters as “villains.”113 
This diatribe immediately follows Lermontov’s establishment of Maximych as a knowledgeable 
authority and thus inherits an empirical and metonymic ring of truth.   The old Captain 
presumably understands the Ossetes and has labeled them fairly, at least in the narrator’s 
experience.  This not only confirms Maximych’s role as informant, but sets the tone for 
depictions of mountaineers in the remainder of “Bela.”  He completes his depiction of the 
indigenous Christians, the Ossetes and Georgians, with a final pronouncement that they are 
“stupid as they come” and “absolutely useless.” These epithets are all overtly negative and 
establish a disparaging image of non-Russian Christians.  They are “rogues,” “scoundrels,” and 
“villains” and “absolutely useless.”  They are of limited instrumental utility—to the narrator, 
Maximych, or the Russian army—and seemingly possess no redeeming qualities to which a 
respectable Russian reader might relate or admire.  Tellingly, these debased Christians also lack 
traits that Russians should fear.  This is not the case for Lermontov’s Muslim characters.  
Moving from defining Caucasian Christians to characterizing the region’s Tatars, 
Lermontov switches to language and labels that are no more positive than those used previously 
to describe Ossetes and Georgians, but nevertheless demand a certain respect and serious 
consideration. Maximych denounces the Karbardans and Chechens as “robbers and vagabonds,” 
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with an additional note that the Chechens especially are “cutthroats.”114 These epithets are far 
more sinister than labeling people as “rogues,” and Lermontov’s narrator adds to the list 
throughout the story.  Circassians become “filthy tramp[s]” and “black-faced scoundrel[s]” with 
“thieving in their blood” who kill with stealth and dishonor by nature.115  
This imagery of “cutthroat robbers” gains a patina of veracity coming from Maximych, 
but his role as the source also lends a more serious cast to the labels.  His status as an 
experienced soldier in the Caucasus, presumably having fought for years against the region’s 
inhabitants, makes him above all else a military expert.  That Karbardans and Chechens stand out 
to this hardened veteran as unpredictable and violent would have had a sobering effect on 
Lermontov’s readers.  If Captain Maxim Maximych holds the Chechens and Karbardians with 
fear and wary respect, so too should the narrator and hosts of young noble officers heading for 
service in the region. If Lermontov’s informant is to be believed, then the fiercely independent 
peoples fighting against the Russian incursion had grown, if anything, more violent and less 
civilized since Pushkin’s sojourn in the isthmus twenty years previous.  But for the author and 
his audience all was not lost—the Caucasus were also known for their extraordinarily beautiful 
women and bountiful supply of alcohol.  
Alcohol in the Caucasus was a singular joy for Russians of all castes.  Lermontov’s 
“Princess Mary” details the life of wealthy Russians resting and recuperating at the famous 
Piatigorsk spa.  In this environment, the narrator—now Pechorin—notes that life is 
disappointingly similar to the court life in the Capitol from which he was exiled: dandies 
gambling and complaining, women with lorgnettes obsessing over prospective husbands for 
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friends and daughters, and a gross fixation on rank.  He also cattily notes that “they drink 
(though not the waters).”116 An acquaintance of Pechorin’s, Private Grushnitsky, goes so far as to 
divide local society into two factions, “[those] who drink water in the morning …and the ones 
who drink wine in the evenings.”117 This divide extended beyond the confines of transplanted 
Russian aristocrats and their exile high society. In the concluding story of A Hero of Our Time, 
“The Fatalist,” an alcoholic Cossack overindulges in chikhir and murders a Russian officer.118  
The Cossack, in every way a commoner, belies alcohol’s ubiquity among the common soldiers 
serving in the Caucasus. Alcohol was an integral part of life in the isthmus in Lermontov’s 
estimations, but the joys of Caucasian wines were not reserved for Cossack micro-vintners and 
spa patrons. 
Captain Maximych again serves as Lermontov’s informant and introduces Pechorin and 
the narrator to the dangers of the Circassians’ relationship with alcohol.  In the context of sharing 
a piece of hard earned wisdom with the narrator about the dangers of consuming alcohol in the 
Caucasus (death or court-martial), the Captain explains that alcohol also makes Circassians even 
more violent and deadly than normal.  He relates that “once they get drunk on buza at a wedding 
or a funeral, it’s sheer murder.”119  That this happened at the residence of a “friendly chief” 
highlights the dramatic extent of alcohol’s effects on the indigenous population.  Maximych 
reiterates this connection when he explains to Pechorin that “[t]hese Asiatics are all the same—
they get their fill of buza, then out come the knives!”120  These passages implicitly enshrine 
alcoholism and a penchant for excess among the host of other defects attributed to “the 
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Circassian” in popular imagery.  Worse still, Maxim Maximych connects the consumption of 
alcohol with the commission of violence.  This association does not likely surprise the 
contemporary reader, nor does it seem unjustified.  It is widely accepted that overconsumption of 
alcohol contributes to violence even today; it is hard to believe that Lermontov’s audience would 
have been unfamiliar with this causal relationship in their own times.   
 Whether intentionally or not, Lermontov’s depiction of djigit violence as a factor of 
alcohol consumption played a greater role than simply as social observation.  The Circassians in 
the story profess various reasons to fight, many of which are recognizably human, if not entirely 
laudable.  Lermontov’s rendition becomes problematic when the actual commission of violence 
occurs overwhelmingly under the influence of liquid intoxicants and is the factor that ultimately 
leads to the conflation of drunkenness and violence in “Bela.”  From this vantage point, any act 
of physical resistance or demonstration of agency on the part of indigenous people is at least 
suspect, if not immediately dismissed as excessive, unjustified, and immoral.   Maxim’s 
portrayal of Circassian violence as intimately connected with alcohol consumption characterized 
the military resistance to the Russian conquest as nothing more than fits of indiscriminate, buza-
fueled debauchery.  Though it is unlikely Lermontov’s masterpiece was widely read in the 
Caucasus and thus did not inspire a justifiable outrage and rejection of this characterization in the 
indigenous population, it was widely-read in Russia.  That the Empire’s nobility and officer 
corps could attribute the staunch Caucasian resistance to overindulgence and substance abuse 
must have made justifying the prolonged conflict much easier.  Circassian alcoholism 
conveniently explained away problematic moral questions about responsibility for the conflict 
and the brutal nature of Russia’s conquest. Like any drunk, the Circassian had to be dealt with 
firmly and finally to have any appreciable impact on his besotted mind.  
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Susan Layton corroborated a linkage between a feminized land and Russian men’s self-
perceptions in her examination of Russian treatment of Georgia and Georgian women.
121
  She 
writes that period literature displays “the systematic advancement of a metaphorical proposition 
about the land as a woman who must be protected and dominated.”122  Although Layton’s 
argument focuses on Georgia and thus emphasizes protection in addition to domination, her 
analysis helps tease out the connection Pushkin and his literary successors engendered in Russian 
imaginations. She posits that such a “metaphorical proposition” relies on a dual image of the 
women and land as both inherently good and beautiful and also capable of great evil and harm.  
Such an ambivalent perspective allowed the creation of “an erotically charged cultural 
mythology about [Russian men] as powerful and rational “European” agents, uniquely capable of 
both protecting [the land] and keeping her wickedness in check.”123  
 One can only imagine the delight of Lermontov’s readers that Russian officers not only 
carried the burden of conquering the Caucasus’ drunken men, but also their beautiful women.  
Following in his predecessor’s stead, Lermontov depicted the one-sided and ill-fated love 
between a Russian officer and a Caucasian beauty that Pushkin immortalized in “Prisoner of the 
Caucasus.”  In his poem “The Demon,” the eponymous character “is not an entirely divine 
…supernatural figure. He is a man writ large.”124 This “man writ large” falls in love with a 
Georgian beauty, engineers the death of her betrothed, and woos the reluctant and grieving 
maiden in an effort to finally receive God’s pardon and a return to paradise.125  Possibly affected 
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by “the sensual heat of high-noon days,” the Demon loves Tamara for her physical beauty and 
exotic charm.
126
  “The Novice” details another love for a Georgian maiden.127 In this tale, her 
beauty takes on a mystical bent: “but so/ deep was the darkness of her eyes/ so full of secrets to 
surmise.”  Her bearing prompts the eponymous neophyte to compare her to a “poplar tree that 
stands/ and queens it over neighboring lands.”128  Taken together, these passages demonstrate 
two traits of Lermontov’s authorship and popular conceptions about women in the Caucasus: 
they were incredibly, almost indescribably beautiful, and they were conceived of and in many 
ways treated like the land itself by invading Russian officers.   
The tragic heroine of “Bela” is the archetypal character of beautiful women of the 
Caucasus.  She first appears in the text at a wedding, captivating Pechorin and the other men 
present with her skillful dancing and singing—and her good looks.  Pechorin is “completely 
absorbed, his eyes never left her,” while Kazbich (the story’s villain) also has his “blazing eyes” 
fixed on the girl.
129
  Bela’s looks and charm stupefy both the foreigner and the djigit equally; her 
beauty transcends the religious, social, and cultural bounds which otherwise polarize Pechorin 
from Kazbich.  The force of her beauty is so overpowering that in their various efforts to possess 
Bela, her brother disappears, her father is robbed and murdered, Kazbich is wounded and 
disapears, and the otherwise disinterested and manipulative antihero of the tale grows emaciated 
and grief stricken when she dies.
130
 Only a great beauty could cause so much misery and 
suffering for the sake of her love, and Bela clearly fits the part. Unfortunately, this beauty proves 
a curse for Bela and ultimately claims her life.  The twice-kidnapped girl dies, stabbed in the 
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back by Kazbich in his failed effort to take her from Pechorin.
131
 These passages demonstrate a 
clear connection in Caucasian romantic literature between a woman’s beauty and a man’s need to 
possess that beauty.   
The literary treatment of this “Asian beauty” resembles that of owners treating chattel 
and not husbands their wives.
132
  In the story, Pechorin entices Bela’s brother Azamat to steal her 
from their father with Kazbich’s legendary horse, Karagyoz, as “bride-money.”133 This summary 
of “Bela” demonstrates on a multitude of levels that women were property to men and conceived 
of in a highly objectified sense.  It is possible to dismiss this as an unfortunate but integral aspect 
of life for many women in the 19
th
 century, but Bela’s objections to her treatment by Pechorin 
clue readers into his exceeding even these repressive norms.  Bela declares her intentions to 
return to her village and vents to Maximych, “I’m not a slave, I’m a chief’s daughter.”134  Bela’s 
reaction strongly indicates that her Russian captor has in some way crossed the line from 
patriarchal spouse to slave owner. It is tempting to regard her kidnap and Pechorin’s aggressive, 
manipulative wooing as the problem, but if such an obvious answer is dismissed as a 
contemporary reading, what remains to offend is her literal captivity in the fort and later, 
Pechorin’s neglectful, disinterested performance of “husband.”135 An earlier fight between the 
two corroborates this reading: when Pechorin arrogantly tells Bela “[y]ou know very well you’ll 
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be mine sooner or later,” she replies, “I’m your prisoner…your slave…of course you can make 
me do what you want.”136  Bela experiences the ultimate objectification in the process of being 
“conquered” by Pechorin: he grows interested, steals her away, then all too soon, “she bores 
[him].”137  Like any of his other possessions, Pechorin leaves her locked in his quarters to pursue 
another form of conquest—boar hunting—that catches his fancy.   
This linkage between conquest and possession is justified in the text by a foreign 
understanding of indigenous cultural tradition.  When Pechorin relates his plans to acquire Bela 
from her brother, Maxim Maximych questions his judgment.  The antihero replies that “an 
uncivilized Circassian girl should be glad to have a nice husband like him, since, after all, 
according to their ways he would be her husband.”  On hearing the suggestion that he return Bela 
to her father, Pechorin retorts that “if we give that old savage back his daughter, he’ll slit her 
throat or sell her.”138 These passages relate the Russian understanding of Circassian notions of 
marriage, in which possession and carnal knowledge, not a ceremony and vows, constitute 
matrimony.  Though this was in all likelihood a gross misinterpretation of the actual beliefs, it 
still provided guidance and incentive to young noblemen.  The image of gorgeous Tatar women 
free for the taking by virile, “civilized” officers was no doubt a high hope for many in the 
Russian Caucasian Corps.
139
 It also exemplified the professed Russian civilizing mission in 
microcosm: conquest of an “uncivilized Circassian” by an ostensibly “civilized” Russian officer.  
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Lermontov’s masterpiece also reflects the connection between Russian domination of 
indigenous women and their homeland.  In an overtly romantic introduction to “Princess Mary,” 
Pechorin falls under the sway of the Caucasus’ beauty, declaring that “[i]t’s a delight to live in a 
place like this.  Every fibre [sic] of my body tingles with joy.”140 The narrator in “Bella” 
regularly intersperses detailed descriptions of the scenery around him and expressions of his awe 
at the “glorious place” with such “splendid scenery” “so bright and gay one felt that one felt like 
staying and living there forever.”141  Although Lermontov and his narrators’ admiration for the 
beauty of the isthmus seem meaningful and genuine, such romantic passages are complicated by 
their authors’ roles in the region. Although Lermontov’s first sojourn more closely resembled a 
sight-seeing tour rather than a tour of duty, his final term of service was as a Russian officer 
heroically fighting Imam Shamil and the Chechen/Dagestani resistance. More importantly, 
Pechorin, Maxim Maximych, and the other nameless Russian servicemen in A Hero of Our Time 
are stationed in the Caucasus as fighting men.  Read in this light, such glowing praise of the 
Caucasus closely resembles Pechorin’s initial fascination with Bela.  And as with their ill-fated 
relationship, desire ultimately led to conquest and possession.  Such an examination of the 
consequences of the conquest and a retrospective inventory of Russian thought and action is best 
exemplified by the final literary effort of one of Russia’s most beloved and influential novelists 
and social commentators, Leo Tolstoy. 
Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy (1828-1910) was born to Count Nikolai Ilyich Tolstoy and 
Mariya Nikolaevna (née Volkonskaya) on their now iconic estate, Yasnaya Polyana.  He was the 
fourth of five children, and aside from losing his parents early in life, his childhood was 
relatively normal for an aristocratic youth of the time.  Educated by tutors, he displayed “a gift 
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for languages and a fondness for literature,” though his time spent studying at Kazan University 
was “notably unsuccessful.”  After deciding that a dissipated life spent gambling and 
womanizing was no longer satisfying, Tolstoy left Russia to join his brother Nikolai, an officer 
serving in the Caucasus.  After reaching Starogladkovskaya, the town in which the Tolstoys were 
billeted, he applied to join his brother’s unit. On 3 January, 1852 the young volunteer was 
appointed Feierverker (bombardier) 4
th
 Class, 4
th
 Battery/20th Artillery Brigade.  He later 
received a commission as an officer in 1854 when he was assigned to active duty as an ensign in 
the new war against Turkey.  The time between his arrival at Starogladkovskaya and his 
departure for the Crimea provided him with combat experience that was “relentless, intense, and 
very dangerous,” but nevertheless inspirational for his later works about the war.142 
 Tolstoy outgrew his youthful “moral disintegration” in the service, and by the 1860s and 
70s had retired from the military and devoted himself to writing, estate management, marriage 
and fatherhood, and educating his serfs.  The mid-1870s were characterized for Tolstoy by bouts 
of depression over the meaning of life, and by 1878, he had undergone what he considered a 
“conversion” experience.  Following this turning point, he wrote and was refused publication for 
“Confession” in 1882.  This work, followed by many others, was the beginning of Tolstoy’s 
devotion to “the propagation of his religious views.”  This comprehensive moral philosophy—
alive and known today as tolstostvo—expounded on topics as diverse as: monetary policy, 
philanthropy, poverty, vegetarianism, the evils of tobacco and alcohol, patriotism, military 
conscription, terrorism, and capital punishment.  Unsurprisingly, the morality of war and a host 
of issues surrounding armed conflict also consumed the author. 
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 Hadji Murat is very much a product of Tolstoy’s “conversion” literature and was the 
author’s final work.143  Though he largely abandoned his overt sermonizing style to craft this 
highly enjoyable narrative, the text retains Tolstoy’s critical tone and homilies about moral life to 
his readers.  It is this pedagogical role and the author’s inherent attention to detail that led him to 
carefully research the characters and history of his tale.  Pevear and Volokhonsky’s notes to the 
text point out several primary sources (personal correspondence and memoirs) that Tolstoy used 
to accurately convey a history of which he was not a part.  For the remainder of the text he relied 
on his own experiences in the Caucasus as a young soldier and officer to guide and inform his 
writing.
144
 The veracity of his accounts is widely renowned, even among Chechens, who so often 
received less than equitable treatment in Russian literature. Contemporarily, Tolstoy “is seen 
almost an honorary Chechen.”  The small Tolstoy Museum in Starogladkovskaya was the only 
Russian museum on Chechen-held territory not closed or destroyed during the Chechen Wars.  
His statue was similarly left unscathed.
145
  As further evidence of his self-appointed role as 
military historian and the accuracy of his accounts, Tolstoy’s “Sebastopol in December” earned 
him the moniker “the first war correspondent.”146 
More even than Marlinsky or Lermontov, Tolstoy’s writing serves as insight into the 
minds and rationale of the nobles, bureaucrats, and officers who shaped and persecuted the war 
in the Caucasus.  Where the former were unwilling exiles, Tolstoy served in the Caucasus as a 
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volunteer; Marlinsky and Lermontov died before leaving the isthmus, while Tolstoy lived long 
enough to question his participation in the war and how his government executed it.  In her 
biography of Tolstoy, Rosamund Bartlett further corroborates the contrast between romantic 
accounts by Pushkin and Lermontov and Tolstoy’s own “highly realistic” accounts that bear the 
hint of a “nascent anti-militaristic stance.”147  Tolstoy worked with archival material and an 
insider’s perspective afforded him by his privileged position as a member of an ancient and 
highly respected noble family and an author of unparalleled popularity at the time to craft Hadji 
Murat.  By using historical materials and meticulous research to shape his critique of mid-19
th
 
century Russian society and politics, Tolstoy created a unique work that interrogates the 
psychology and causal linkage between Russian perceptions of Caucasian peoples and their 
commission of the war against them.   
 “Hadji Murat” is set in Chechnya in 1851. At this point in the Caucasian War, the 
Russians under Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov had implemented on a wide scale the 
systematic deforestation and aul destroying campaign that would ultimately brutalize the last 
Chechen and Dagestani resistance into defeat.  Tolstoy’s archival research guided his outline of 
“the plan of Ermolov and Velyaminov” in a comically biting critique of Nicholas’s inflated sense 
of skill and self-importance.
148
 M.S. Vorontsov biographer Anthony Rhinelander corroborates 
Tolstoy’s research and conclusions in his own account of the war at this time.  Vorontsov’s 
disastrous but expected failure to succeed in Nicholas’ ill-conceived Dargo campaign highlighted 
that tsar’s incompetence at martial strategic planning.  Rhinelander notes that in an effort to save 
face and the conquest, Nicholas “declared himself satisfied…tacitly recognized his mistake and 
allowed Vorontsov henceforth to pursue the struggle against the highlanders in his own 
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fashion.”149  Although that tsar did not live to see it, Shamil surrendered in 1859, effectively 
ending concerted resistance to Russian domination.  “Hadji Murat” serves as a recollection of 
Tolstoy’s own participation in these campaigns and an interrogation into the justification and 
commission of the final years of the Caucasian War.
150
 
 Tolstoy depicts a Russian army convinced of its eventual victory, but nevertheless 
pervasively afraid of their enemy.  When the advance scouts meet with Hadji Murat’s envoy to 
discuss his “coming over,” one soldier holds a broken conversation with the mountaineer.  His 
comrades end his jocularity over the “nice talk” by pointing out that, had they met “face-to-face, 
he’[d] spill your guts for you.”151 This brusque reminder of their enemy’s deadly potential nods 
to Chechen stealth and efficacy at fighting in the forest.  Whatever the Russian respect for 
mountaineer bravery, martial prowess, or their sense of wild freedom, to the common soldier 
fighting in the Caucasus in the mid-19
th
 century, they were still very much feral animals to fear 
in their own environment.  This notion is corroborated when Prince Semyon Mikhailovich 
Vorontsov agrees to meet Hadji Murat and accept his pledge of allegiance to the Russian cause 
“at the place appointed for woodcutting.”152 Despite his numerical advantage—two companies 
on woodfelling duty and an escort, versus Hadji Murat and his five murids—Vorontsov’s fear of 
the naib’s (lieutenant’s) skill and reputation lead him to cautiously meet in a liminal zone where 
the Russian’s are progressively erasing the Chechen home advantage.  Though the Russians had 
every seeming advantage, their fear drove them to disproportionate responses, which manifested 
itself in their strategy and tactics. 
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 Tolstoy’s first nod to the brutality of the Russian campaign as he witnessed it in the early 
1850s comes in the story’s exposition and is a recurring theme of the narrative.  When the 
fugitive naib first appears, it is in an unnamed aul conversing with an old man about Russian 
actions in a nearby village.  The old man curses the “Russian dogs” for burning the hay in 
Michitsky.
153
 Hay was a vital commodity in most Caucasian societies for feeding cattle and 
horses, and the mountainous terrain did not always lend itself to easy farming.  Having survived 
decades of Russian military actions in the region, many communities were not in a comfortably 
stable setting that lent itself to effective agriculture. For the invaders to now target supplies like 
hay was an especially effective tactic for subjugating the stubborn resistance.  As Tolstoy knew 
when he wrote this story over a half a century later, simply burning a community’s hay was not 
the worst of which the Russian army was capable. 
 Tolstoy recalls the total commitment to violence that characterized the final years of 
Russia’s conquest in the Caucasus with his rendition of the destruction of Sado’s aul.  Sado, the 
man who sheltered Hadji Murat at the story’s beginning, flees to the mountains with his family at 
the Russians’ approach and returns after their retreat.  Tolstoy notes that the soldiers were 
ordered to “burn grain, hay, and the saklyas (houses),” but added killing whatever livestock 
remained and looting the deserted village to their punitive actions.
154
  When Sado and the other 
Chechens return, they find Sado’s home and their aul totally destroyed:  
the roof had fallen in, the door and posts…were burned down, and the inside was befouled….the 
apricot and cherry trees were broken and scorched, and, worst of all, the beehives had all been 
burned….The spring had been befouled, obviously on purpose, so that it was impossible to take 
water from it. The mosque was also befouled.
155
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Such destruction was terrible enough, but the Russians’ worst crime was the murder of Sado’s 
young son, “the handsome boy with shining eyes,” who was “stabbed in the back with a 
bayonet.”156 
Such wanton and complete destruction seems to exceed even the broad orders given to 
Butler and the raiding companies.  The recurring act of “befouling” homes, wells, and holy 
places demonstrates the hatred and scorn Russian soldiers felt for their enemies.  The all-
eclipsing brutality of the Russian campaign is evident in that this raid is presumably 
representative in a conquest strategy that called for the systematic felling of Chechnya’s dense 
forests and destruction of Chechen villages. It was not in specific retaliation for a particular 
mountaineer raid, but was conducted “in fulfillment of these instructions from Nicholas…in 
January 1852.”157 The normalcy with which this attack is treated during and after the aul’s 
destruction by the Russian soldiers and officers adds a chilling testament to the equanimity with 
which they perpetrated such brutality.   
Tolstoy introduces the eponymous character as “Shamil’s naib, famous for his exploits, 
who never rode out otherwise than with his guidon and an escort of dozens of murids.” Hadji 
Murat is dressed in the expected mountaineer garb: cherkeska, bashlyk and burka, armed with a 
rifle, pistol, and saber.
158
  His mount is repeatedly admired throughout the story, first by the 
Russian officer Butler, “a horse fancier,” and later by the Cossack escort from which the naib 
and his nukers (bodyguards) make their ill-fated escape at the story’s conclusion.159 In short, he 
is the paragon of “mountaineer:” well dressed, well armed, and well mounted.  Tolstoy’s 
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characterization of Hadji Murat immediately evokes the previous generations of authorship about 
the Caucasus and its highland resistance.   
Readers might initially make a reasonable connection between less than admirable 
characters from earlier stories (e.g. Kazbich or Sultan Ahmet Khan) and Tolstoy’s subject, but 
Hadji Murat is a far more complex character.  He represents Tolstoy’s understanding of the 
“real” mountaineers: proud, hard, martial men to be feared, but also highly spiritual, devoted to 
their families and people, and willing to live and die by their own strict moral code.  Seen in this 
light, Hadji Murat is less a villain than the story’s hero and an exemplar of Tolstoy’s post-
conversion morality.  But more importantly than how Tolstoy viewed this historical figure is 
how his readers would perceive the man.  Although the author often leaves Hadji Murat to charm 
readers with his personality and “childlike” smile, characters like Butler and Marya 
Dmitrievna—themselves portrayed as simple, admirable people—feel an instinctual affinity for 
the mountaineer.
160
  Perhaps the most obvious trope used to cue readers into Hadji Murat’s 
worthiness is Tolstoy’s depiction of Prince Semyon Mikhailovich Vorontsov’s young stepson as 
the naib’s friend.161 Bulka likes and trusts the mountaineer, enough to sit on his lap and protest at 
being removed, which strongly evokes biblical imagery of the lion and lamb.  This analogy is 
one few Orthodox readers would have failed to appreciate. 
Tolstoy left his readers with an ambivalent understanding of Hadji Murat and similarly 
shaded their perceptions of the people and polemic he represents.  Tolstoy acknowledges the 
naib’s familiarity with and talent for committing violence, but he also outlines the code 
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according to which Hadji Murat takes violent action in revenge.  Pevear and Volokhonsky’s 
notes reveal that for the sections of the story in which Hadji Murat shares his life story and 
motivations with the viceregal adjutant Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (1825-88), “Tolstoy 
used Loris-Melikov’s actual transcript of his conversations with Hadji Murat.”162 This 
autobiographical conversation explains Hadji Murat’s duty to family, friends, and faith and his 
conflict between fulfilling his obligations to one over the other.  It also explains, in the words of 
one of 19
th
 century Russia’s greatest enemies, why he fought the Empire.  Half a century after 
Shamil’s defeat, Tolstoy’s research and memories created a narrative that conveyed what 
decades of romantic literature and one-dimensional analyses of their enemies could not: the 
mountaineers fought to defend their land and faith, their families, and their way of life.  
 
Pushkin and his literary descendants dominated the “literary vogue” central to their 
compatriots’ understanding of the war on their southern border.  Their visions of the Caucasian 
isthmus, the peoples who lived in the mountainous region, and the clash of cultures that 
accompanied Russia’s incursion into this insular, protected land not only documented their 
experiences but also informed and engendered similar images and preconceptions among their 
aristocratic audiences.  Scholarship on the conquest underappreciated and grossly underestimated 
their influence over the historical developments, strategic and tactical decisions, and the home 
populace’s understanding of the war.  Still, shaping the ideas that guided many of the younger, 
lower ranking officers in their daily prosecution of the war only addresses a portion of the impact 
that orientalist discourse had on the conquest.  Such a pattern of thought and language also 
characterized the writings and perceptions of the strategists—the generals responsible for 
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defeating the mountaineers and bringing glory and the path to Persia to the tsars.  The most 
colorful, and arguably also the most influential, of these generals was Alexei Yermolov. 
General of Infantry Alexei PetrovichYermolov was born to a noble family on 4 June, 
1774 and raised in Moscow.  Before enrolling in Moscow State University’s boarding school 
program, he received an education at home from tutors.  At this time in Russia it was customary 
for parents to enlist their children “at the time of their birth or infancy,” so that by the time they 
were old enough to serve actively, they would already have attained officer rank.  By this 
loophole, Yermolov was a sergeant in the prestigious Life Guards at 14, a lieutenant at 17, and in 
1793, after giving up his rank and billet in the Guards and serving a brief, unexciting tour in 
Moldavia against the Ottomans, entered the artillery and received the rank of captain of artillery.  
The captain was a scant 19 years old.
163
 
Yermolov’s military career was periodically turbulent and occasionally borderline-
treasonous, but more than anything else, it was long and spectacularly distinguished.  According 
to Alexander Mikaberidze, former expert on international law for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Georgia, current professor of history at Louisiana Statue University at Shreveport, and the 
compiler and translator of Alexei Yermolov’s memoirs, the general was “a true legend….who 
overcame imperial disgrace and exile to command armies and conquer provinces.”164 From 1793 
until early 1816, Yermolov dedicated himself to honorable service, seeking combat experience 
and promotions alike.  While his martial skills were largely unimpeachable and his bravery 
recognized officially several times, his “brash” attitude and “independent character” earned him 
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a multitude of highly placed enemies.  Thus his many promotions and advancements were often 
counter balanced by periods of official disgrace and punitive reassignment.  Mikaberidze cites a 
conversation included in Alexander Yermolov’s biography of his illustrious ancestor that 
succinctly characterizes the General’s career in his own words: “I have either to retire or wait for 
war where I will be able to gain with my sword everything which I have lost.”165 
Following the general’s superior service in the war against Napoleon’s armies, Tsar 
Alexander I appointed Yermolov the commander-in-chief of Russian forces in Georgia, 
commander of the Independent Georgian Corps, and the Russian ambassador to Persia on April 
21, 1816.  These billets were an enormous responsibility in their own right, but his position at the 
crossroads of Russian political and military interests in the region also meant that Yermolov was 
responsible for “dealing with the north Caucasian mountaineers.”166 He served in this capacity 
for 11 years before the new tsar, Nicholas I, forced him to resign his post and then his 
commission in April and December, respectively, of 1827.
167
  Nicholas ultimately relented in 
1831, restoring Yermolov’s commission and placing him on the State Council.  When Russia 
entered the Crimean War (1853-56), the 79 year old general volunteered his services.  In March 
1856 Yermolov received news of the loss of Sebastopol, and “took it so close to heart that he 
suffered paralysis and partial loss of vision.”  Yermlov never truly recovered from this shock, 
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and he died April 23, 1861 after a long and unsuccessful battle with a resurgent fever he 
originally contracted in the Caucasus.
168
 
Yermolov’s descriptions of his war’s brutality and violence are often connected in his 
writings with orientalist descriptions of his enemies that justify or explain the general’s tactical 
and strategic decisions.  In his commission of Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus, Yermolov 
diverged from his predecessors’ traditional preference for indirect rule and prosecuted a “strategy 
of systematic subjugation and expansion.” Yermolov biographer Aleksandr Kavtaradze cites a 
document from the Russian Central Military Historical Archive with convincing evidence of the 
general’s philosophy of conquest: “one execution can save hundreds of Russians from death and 
thousands of Muslims from treason.”169 It was this philosophy and how the iconoclastic general 
carried out his war against the mountaineer resistance that first inspired the idea for this thesis.   
 Arriving in Tiflis (now Tbilisi, the capitol of Georgia) on 22 October, Yermolov spent six 
months studying the country, its people, and the surrounding actors.  In this time, he formulated 
and documented in his memoirs the initial impressions of the people that would guide his policy 
making for the next 11 years and earn him an immortal reputation in both Russia and the 
Caucasus.  His assessments were largely bureaucratic in nature, dividing the districts in Georgia 
by their produce and wealth.
170
  Although he praised the productive capacity of several regions 
under his control, when he described people—both individuals and groups—his language was 
less than positive.  The Ossetians especially seem to have drawn his ire and are among the first in 
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his account to be described in overtly orientalist terms.  Disparaging these recent converts to 
Orthodoxy, Yermolov expressed his hope that Christianity might cure them of their “brutal 
customs and inclinations to thievery.”171  This passage demonstrates the presence of two 
fundamental issues at stake in this thesis: the perception of indigenous custom as nothing more 
than violent banditry, and the role of identity—especially ethnic and religious identity—as a 
determining factor in the perceived level of civilization.   
 The significance of the religious identity of peoples in the Caucasus was intimately tied 
with the relationship between Orthodoxy and the State in imperial Russia.  In his contribution to 
Edward Lazzerini and Daniel Brower’s Russia’s Orient, historian Michael Khodarkovsky 
accents an interesting reciprocity to the relationship between Orthodox Russia and the various 
peoples it met on the periphery.  He notes that “[t]he encounter with numerous non-Christian 
peoples crystalized Moscow’s self-image as an Orthodox Christian State.”172 Thus the Russians 
drew a heightened and distinct sense of self-identity in contrast to their southern neighbors on the 
basis of religious difference alone.  This concept of self-definition provides the focus for 
Khodarkovsky’s essay.  He proposes a “process of encounter, contact, and incorporation” as the 
formula by which this was accomplished.
173
 This was the basic system by which Russia—like 
many European empires of the time—not only gained territory, but also a stronger sense of self.   
Unlike the Catholic Church in Rome, Russian Orthodoxy was uniquely tied and 
subordinated to the Russian state.  What Tsar Alexis I began with the dismissal of Patriarch 
Nikon in 1667 and Peter I and Catherine II finished with the financial and bureaucratic crippling 
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of the institution was the utter subordination of the Orthodox Church to the tsarist government.  
This was certainly the case in the 19
th
 century, even under such obsessively devout tsars as 
Alexander I and Nicholas I. Historian Nicholas Riasanovsky corroborates this in his seminal 
work Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, positing that “[r]eligion was used to preach 
obedience to the emperor….Even the Church was effectively controlled by the state and 
generally did its bidding.”174 During the reigns of Alexander and Nicholas, this marriage 
between the Church and State was very much an official, normalized aspect of imperial rule.  
By virtue of this proximity, the Russian Orthodox Church often served not only as a key 
support mechanism for Russia’s tsars domestically, but abroad as well. Nicholas’ Minister of 
Education, Sergei Uvarov, published the first step in what became the policy of official 
nationality on April 2, 1833.  He distilled this pedagogical program, which ultimately “reached 
beyond intellectual circles, lectures, and books” as the imperial cardinal rule for thirty years, 
from the three fundamental characteristics of the Russian people: “Orthodoxy, autocracy, and 
nationality.”175  This “brief formula” dominated the Russian press and much of its other 
authorship, its intellectual and ideological debates, and even its foreign policy; it should not be 
forgotten, however, that it was first and foremost a pedagogical instrument to inculcate Russia’s 
noble youth with the appropriate values to prepare them for service to the tsars.   
Also significant for the present discussion is Riasanovsky’s conclusion that the program 
was inextricably linked with Russian identity and defined how and why Nicholas ruled. For him, 
Orthodoxy was the “first principle of the government doctrine,” followed closely by 
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subservience to the autocrat.
176
  Thus Riasanovsky explains that for Nicholas, “obedience was 
rated very high, originality very low.”177 This characterization of Nicholas’ rule helps explain his 
draconian response to continued and increasing recalcitrance on the part of his southern 
neighbors.  In fateful conjunction with the despotism of the tsar’s rule, religious identity 
“indicated fundamental dividing lines” that afforded the emperor a simple, easily justified 
criterion by which he measured right and wrong, good and evil, and Russia and the enemy.
178
  
Thus Nicholas had the ideological basis—one rooted firmly in the very history and faith of 
Russia and two centuries of his family’s rule—to hold himself separate from and superior to the 
peoples of the Caucasus, to attempt their subjugation, and in the face of their resistance, punish 
them for their disobedience to God and his agent on earth, the Romanov Tsar.
179
 In turn, 
Yermolov’s service to “God’s agent” demanded that he punish those recalcitrant subjects under 
his control.  As nominal converts and recidivist thieves, the Ossetes of Yermolov’s memoir must 
have seemed particularly culpable.  Their obedience to the new governor was inconsistent at 
best, and as was so often the case throughout history, the only threat to God’s will on earth more 
dangerous than an infidel was a heretic. It is not surprising these people drew the ire of the 
“Czar’s general.” 
 Yermolov divided his descriptive memoir along geo-political lines of power, and having 
treated with the largely despicable but nevertheless pacified peoples “under our control,” he 
turned his pen to depicting the peoples caught between the two juggernauts of the Russian and 
Persian Empires.  The first two groups to come under his scrutiny were the Zakubantsy, “a well-
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known, martial and seldom quiet nation,” and the Kabardins, “the most courageous among the 
mountaineers…who often desperately resisted the Russians in bloody battles.”180 These initial 
descriptions are surprisingly benign, even positive, despite their overt references to these groups’ 
resistance to Russian interests in the region.  This is probably a reflection of the period’s 
romantic paradox so prevalent among Russian officers of the time: they at once respected the 
martial character and devotion to freedom of the mountaineer while simultaneously prosecuting 
an imperialistic war to civilize and dominate them.  General of Infantry Yermolov, similarly 
notorious for his fierce martial character and iconoclastic polemics with the Russian state, no 
doubt saw some of himself in these independent-minded, fierce warriors.  This probable 
perception of shared attributes would more than explain his scorn for the various Georgian 
Christians living peaceably under his regency and thinly disguised sympathy and respect for the 
mountaineers. 
Despite this empathy, identity again becomes the focus of Yermolov’s memoirs as he 
explains the genesis of the conflict. He notes in particular that the Karbardins “were pagans less 
than 100 years ago,” and due largely to Russian bureaucratic and clerical indifference, Islam was 
“allowed…to spread there.” This move proved fateful, as these people, whom Yermolov alleges 
were long allies of Russia, soon grew “hostile [and] unanimously resolved to defend their 
faith.”181  This passage magnifies the impact of religious affiliation on the nature of the conquest.  
Beyond discursive power structures in which Asian Christians were lesser men of faith than their 
“European” counterparts from Russia, this discussion casts the Karbardin’s religious identity as 
the genitive catalyst for the violence in the region.  Yermolov reserves some blame for the 
incompetence of his predecessors, especially General Rtischev, who attempted a large-scale 
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conquest of the Karbardins by bribery.  Though this tactic had a long history in the region and 
would see continued use, Yermolov acerbically derides Rtischev’s failure for selecting a 
“gang…of vagabonds” for his grand application of the technique.  These men accepted their 
bribes, medals, and ranks, returned to Karbarda, and the “[r]aids, murders, and pillaging went 
on.”182 
Unlike the Karbardins, whose courage and historical relationship with Russia Yermolov 
could admire, the Chechens engendered nothing but vitriolic hatred in the general.  He labels 
Chechens “the most evil of all the brigands attacking the Line” and Chechnya “the nest of all 
brigands.” The heavily forested land became a refuge for “the scum of any fleeing criminals,” 
who in turn served as the Chechens’ “accomplices…who were willing to participate in their 
pillages.”183  Yermolov’s memoir does not reveal any of the ambivalence that characterized his 
description of the various Georgian Christians or Karbardans—the Chechens and their 
“accomplices” were pure, irredeemable criminals in his mind.  There is no mention of their 
martial prowess or courage, nor any admission of Russian complicity in the prolonged struggle.  
For Yermolov, Chechnya was nothing more than a land of “impassable woods” filled with 
dangerous criminals. 
Having committed his conclusions about the character of the peoples under his nominal 
rule to the first pages of his memoir, Yermolov turned to diarizing his policies and actions in the 
Caucasus.  He first discharged his duty as the Ambassador to Persia with a six-month diplomatic 
tour of that empire. During this absence, his acting deputy in Georgia died and the mountaineer 
resistance surged.  On his return, he noted that “evil designs were afoot in Daghestan,” in which 
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rulers from that nation, Avaria, and Chechnya were complicit.  He notes that along the Line, “the 
Chechens committed most of the disturbances and brigandage.” In response to his fears of unrest 
in Daghestan and the very real attacks by the Chechens, Yermolov began preparations for an 
incursion into Chechnya and an advance to the Caucasian Line.
184
  This section highlights the 
connections in Yermolov’s mind between his perceptions of mountaineer resistance and his own 
strategic and tactical decisions.   
His April 1818 expedition demonstrated the complexity of the military situation along the 
Line.  A tour of the forts and Cossack stanitsi along the Line provided further evidence of the 
incompetence of his predecessors as revealed in the general state of disrepair in which he found 
the right of the Line.
185
  This infrastructural weakness was exacerbated in Yermolov’s estimation 
by a standing policy prohibiting the pursuit of raiders back across the Kuban River.  Seeing that 
“nothing could be done to strengthen the [Line] and prevent the attacks,” Yermolov reversed this 
policy.
186
  On the surface this seems a sound strategic decision, but the general’s memoir betrays 
contributing factors to this choice.   
Yermolov writes that Russian forces “tended to act cautiously” in combating the 
Zakubantsi raids because of their “close connection” with the Karbardans and Chechens.  As a 
result,  
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[t]he locals knew about this restraint and committed their crimes with greater impudence; there 
were instances when returning from a raid, the locals halted as soon as they crossed the border and 
taunted our pursuing troops by parading their pillage in front of them.
187
 
That the Russian Imperial Army felt compelled to “act cautiously” in pursuing and punishing 
raids on their forts and settlements is an enormous admission.  Though he words it carefully and 
with restraint, Yermolov’s exploration of this policy and the justification behind it reveals the 
terrifying reputation with which they invested the mountaineers.  It is even more striking that 
raiders could “impudently…parade their pillage” in front of their victims and leave unscathed.  
This speaks to the degree of fear the invading forces felt—it was, quite literally, debilitating.  To 
fight this fear and the increasing brazenness with which the Zakubantsy conducted their raids, 
Yermolov abolished the policy of not pursuing beyond the Kuban, and instead mandated their 
pursuit.  This reversal established, as he names it, “a permanent state of conflict with these 
people” in order to end their incessant, brazen brigandage.  Tellingly, his account ends not with 
mention of the efficacy of this reversal, but with Yermolov’s hope that his men would not miss 
an opportunity to exact “vengeance.”188 
 Yermolov continues his memoirs with an account of his initial encampment at 
Chervlennaia—the crossing near the site that would become the terrible Fort Grozny—and his 
interactions with the remaining Chechen locals.  On meeting with the “elders from all the major 
settlements,” Yermolov explained to them—and to posterity as well—that he was not there to:  
punish them for old transgressions but rather to request that no crimes be committed in the future; 
that to show their consent, they must renew their old oath of obedience and return any prisoners 
they still held in captivity.
189
    
Yermolov continues, explaining that the chief point of contention in the negotiations was over 
the release of Russian hostages, and that the “most notorious brigands” among the Chechens 
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were “agitating against [the Russians].190 An earlier passage betrays the double standard by 
which Yermolov operated when he made these demands: to assure the cooperation of the 
“peaceful” Chechen villagers, the general “took hostages from their villages.”191  
 Yermolov’s description of his establishment of Fort Grozny in the summer of 
1818 displays the hypocritical tendency his responses to mountaineer aggression often took.  His 
dogged insistence on and seemingly equal Chechen resistance to returning prisoners highlights 
the importance of captive figures in the conflict.  Although his memoir does not say so explicitly, 
Russian pride must have resented the capture and consequent enslavement of their soldiers and 
officers by savages and brigands.  Yermolov’s pronounced affection for his troops and fierce 
loyalty to Russia would have magnified his reaction.  Yet to combat this deplorable tactic, which 
often manifested as the capture of non-combatants and usually resulted in an indigenous form of 
slavery, Yermolov resorted to essentially the same crime. Similarly, Yermolov’s response to 
received intelligence about an imminent Chechen-Lezghin attack on a Russian convoy was to 
escort the supply train to the fort and then pursue the attacking forces.  Colonel Vel’iaminov 
chased them to Achaga aul, where the Russian artillery “acted with great success,” and “[t]he 
villagers came out [of the aul] pleading for mercy.
192
 Although in this instance Colonel 
Vel’iaminov “could not ignore their pleas” and stopped short of butchering all occupants of the 
village, this was not the standard by which Yermolov and his commanders normally operated. 
His memoir recounts his orders to Major General Pestel to attack another village, Beshly, and: 
[E]ven if the size of the town prevented us from razing it, we would still be able to inflict 
considerable damage with our artillery.  We should then seize the moment to drive off the horses 
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and cattle since their loss would be more damaging as they constitute the principal wealth of the 
locals.
193
 
After taking Beshly and holding it for some time, Pestel’s unit was soon surrounded by “30,000 
troops from Daghestan.”  After fierce fighting inflicted “appalling losses” on the Dagestanis with 
their canister shot and artillery, Pestel retook the town, and per Yermolov’s orders, “eradicate[d] 
this old nest of robbers and traitors.”194   
The most explicit and horrifying description of the brutality of Russian punitive raids 
comes at the close of Yermolov’s memoirs in his recollection of the defeat of Dady Urt on the 
Terek River: 
many of the inhabitants [of Dady Urt] killed their wives to avoid them being captured….[w]e 
captured approximately 140 women and children who were spared by our soldiers…[h]owever, 
many more were massacred or died in their homes because of artillery and fires.
195
  
Yermolov follows this passage with mention that “[m]any women attacked our soldiers with 
daggers” and admits that in the “savage fighting…anyone with weapons in hand was 
slaughtered.”196 This renders his contention that the fires and explosions were responsible for the 
deaths of women and children highly unbelievable. It is interesting to note that Yermolov uses 
terms like “savage,” “massacre,” and “slaughtered” to describe the actions of his troops.  Such 
terminology was usually reserved for entries about his enemies and not his own men.  It is 
possible this indicates his evaluation that Dady Urt and the slaughter of people he traditionally 
viewed as non-combatants was far from the “civilized” warfare to which he aspired.  Regardless 
of his martial preferences, the general’s troops massacred men, women, and children and 
completely wiped Dady Urt and its people from the hillsides of Chechnya.  This battle and the 
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pervasive mimicry of such tactics cast Russian raids in Chechnya and elsewhere in a genocidal 
cast. 
 Such accounts betray Russian employment of similar measures against those they 
officially categorized as deplorable.  In their outrage at the regular capture of Russian prisoners, 
Russian commanders took “hostages” to ensure good behavior or leverage desperate 
communities.  Out of fear of mountaineer raids, Russian commanders marched on Caucasian 
villages in punitive expeditions that rendered at least as much destruction as those to which they 
responded.  Despite his hateful characterizations of the Chechens as “thieves” and “brigands,” 
Yermolov authorized the theft of horses and cattle on such a grand scale as to cripple indigenous 
economies and starve the resistance into submission.
197
  Yermolov confesses that after his army 
defeated Tramov, “[the] village was razed to the ground, some 2,000 horses and all the cattle 
were seized and the residents were only allowed to take their wives and children.”198 This 
account lends an ironic account to a future entry in which Yermolov ordered punitive expeditions 
against the Chechens “who were continuously engaged in brigandage, and especially the 
residents of Kachkalyk, who had seized our horses.”199That the citizens of Tramov were allowed 
to escape with only their wives and children strongly suggests that Russian troops entering the 
city to burn it were afforded the opportunity to loot the abandoned homes before setting the fires. 
Though not as pervasively debilitating as the destruction and theft of livestock, looting is more 
personal and seems proof of Russian “brigandage.”  
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 Brutal, often merciless fighting and destructive punitive campaigns would characterize 
Russian strategy in the Caucasus for the next four decades until the defeat of Imam Shamil and 
the Chechen-Dagestani resistance in the Caucasian War.  Yermolov’s memoir is replete with 
characterizations of Caucasian peoples as indolent drunks, savages, criminals, and brigands.  It 
also contains his own euphemistic or unconscious admission of culpability in the same crimes 
that he so deplored in his enemies.  Yermolov’s memoir consistently demonstrates the double 
standard by which Russian forces felt they had to operate in their “civilizing” mission in the 
south: to combat and end “mountaineer savagery,” the Russians became savages themselves.  
 General Yermolov was officially relieved of his duties in the Caucasus on April 9, 1827 
by decree of the new emperor. General Ivan Paskevich replaced him, somewhat prematurely to 
Nicholas’ orders and without the prescribed diplomacy and tact such a replacement demanded. 
He did this with the support of the man Nicholas assigned to mediate the transition and reconcile 
the squabbling generals, Chief of Staff General Ivan Ivanovich Diebitch.
200
  In a coincidence 
rendered strangely common by the convoluted and extensive interrelationships of the Russian 
nobility that comprised the officer ranks, General Diebitch’s nephew is the final officer whose 
writings offer insight into the Russian prosecution of their war in the Caucasus, Baron Tornau.   
Baron Fedor Fedorovich Tornau, nephew of Chief of Staff Diebitch, was born in 1810 to 
an artillery colonel and member of the Baltic Kurland Baron line.  Like Pushkin, he was 
educated in the Lycée, where he received the best education Russia could offer at the time.  On 
graduation, he entered the military, and received his commission in 1828.  Despite his uncle’s 
efforts to shelter and sponsor him with service in Poland, Tornau desired more kinetic military 
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experience and requested a transfer to the Caucasus.  In April 1832, Tornau arrived in Tiflis and 
began a twelve-year term of service in the Caucasus.  Many of his early assignments were 
bureaucratic in nature; his education, literacy, and attention to detail—not to mention a highly 
ranked and strategically positioned uncle—all lent themselves to keeping Tornau safely 
ensconced in an office.  However, these same characteristics and the young officer’s discerning 
eye also recommended him for a special reconnaissance mission.  In 1835, Baron Tornau dressed 
in the accoutrements of a Circassian and, along with his indigenous guides, traveled incognito 
along the Black Sea coast to reconnoiter that shoreline for his state.  These travels provided the 
young man with extensive interaction with the indigenous populations along the Left Flank and 
the experiences and materials to compose his memoir.
201
 
Tornau’s memoir only partially reflects this thesis’ argument that Russians described 
their enemies using the orientalist lingua franca that characterized European discussion of those 
people they encountered at the peripheries of their empires.  At first mention, Tornau describes 
“Circassians” who lived under nominal Russian control.202 Later, “Circassians” is used to 
identify the Cossacks’ enemies in their protracted, internecine war.  In the first instance, their 
state of subjectivity, and presumably the subsequent resentment Tornau only marginally 
disguises in his description of their character, both seem likely causes for his use of the inclusive 
if not entirely precise label “Circassian.” Though of course labeling each distinct group in a 
region famous for its diversity and multitude of tiny, insular communities of unique peoples and 
                                                          
201
 Tornau, F.F., Vospominaniia Kavkavskovo Ofitsera: Chast’ Vtoraya, 1835, 36, 37, 38 (A.G. Makarov, original text, 
pub. 2000). http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Kavkaz/XIX/1820-1840/Tornau_1/text21.htm 
(accessed January 21, 2013).  The “Left” and “Right” flanks of the Caucasus were designations of the fronts from 
the Russian perspective looking south.  Thus, the Eastern Caucasus were considered the “Left Flank,” while the 
West was named the “Right Flank.” Biographical information from G.A. Dzidzaria, F.F. Tornau I evo Materiali 
(Moscow: Glavnaya Redaktsia Vostochnoy Literaturi izdatel’stva “Nauka:” 1976), 
http://irsl.narod.ru/books/KMTweb/text.html (accessed 3/6/2013).  
202
 Tornau, Vospominaniia Kavkavskovo Ofitsera, 1. 
Lawrence Myers THESIS Prof. Shneer 
81 
 
languages is an enormous undertaking, it does not seem likely that facility of conversation was 
Tornau’s criterion for giving groups their names in the face of his precision in the preceding 
sentence.  Rather, his “Circassians” would immediately fall under the same analytical category 
Pushkin created for his “Circassians.”  Serving long after Pushkin’s work became wildly popular 
among the nobility, Tornau’s labeling scheme evoked immediate associations and connotations 
of his enemies’ violence based on literary tradition; it legitimized his enemies and made them 
worthy of his enmity. In the second instance, however, Tornau delineates the aggressors in a 
complex conflict in binary terms: Cossacks against Circassians. 
In the early sections of his memoir, Tornau lists three peoples living near his fortress at 
Prochniy Okop (the “Rugged Trench,” a fortress in the line of the Kuban River cordon).  His 
description of the enemy is unique among first-hand accounts of the conquest in that he takes 
care to list these groups as distinct entities, even in the violent context of their relationship with 
the Russians.
203
   More often, in both popular literature and personal writings of this time, 
identifying the enemies of Russia required but one, expansive label onto which the authors could 
then hang charged descriptors like “violent,” “savage,” “bestial,” and “merciless.” These familiar 
catch-all terms, Abrek (which in contemporary Russian is synonymous with bandit or thief, 
though originally it referenced people who lived along the Abrek River), 
highlander/mountaineer, Circassian, and of course, Tatar, all make appearances in Tornau’s 
memoir.  Based on this nuance, one could even say that Tornau was progressive for his time and 
the body politic he represented.  His attention to specificity in describing ethnic groups serves as 
a valuable contrast against which Tornau’s otherwise pervasive use of orientalist discourse seems 
even more significant and widespread.  
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Tornau corroborated the violent, warlike reputation of peoples of the Caucasus early in 
the second portion of his memoir.  In describing the groups living around Prochniy Okop, he 
listed the Abadzekhs, Shapsugs, and Natukhais—all of whom “devote themselves to permanent, 
merciless war” with the Russians.  Tornau dispatches his interest in the differences among locals 
as quickly as he introduces it; nearby, other, undistinguished “Circassians” (those without 
individual identity or group designations) accepted Russian suzerainty only because it preserved 
their access to village pastures.
204
  Reading the memoir, one can sense Tornau’s scorn for such 
meek, self-interested allies, though the “Circassians’” undoubted resentment at their position also 
impresses itself on readers.  Of greater concern to his readers, particularly his comrades in the 
Caucasian Corps, was the determination of these enemies who waged this “permanent, merciless 
war.”  Tornau relates that the raids were so relentless that “[t]oday Cossacks can kill a party of 
Abreks to the last man, and tomorrow a different band sneaks into our domain almost on the very 
path of their dead comrades.”205  The frequency of such attacks would have worn down the most 
determined defense; more significantly, they would have caused enormous psychological harm.  
Living in constant fear of attack could not have been easy to survive without sustaining 
significant psychological trauma. Tornau also betrays the Russians’ dogged dispatch of such 
raiding parties.  Despite their exhaustion, the Cossacks in this passage were winning the war of 
attrition. 
The sustained anxiety was even more detrimental and invasive in the face of djigit 
unpredictability, stealth, and determination.  Tornau wrote that “[t]he mountaineer raids on our 
borders increased and with such insolent character that the Cossacks could not, in the end, find 
                                                          
204
 Ibid., 2. “posvyativ sebya na postoyannuyu, besposchadnuyu voinu s name”  
205
 Ibid. “Sevodnia kazakam udayotsia perebit partiyu abrekov do poslednevo cheloveka, a zavtra drugaia whaika 
probiraetcia  nashi predelui pochti po sledam svoikh pogibshikh tovarischei.” 
Lawrence Myers THESIS Prof. Shneer 
83 
 
safety in their own villages.”206  In every sense of the word, the mountaineers terrorized Cossack 
settlements, outposts, and forts.  To be deprived of all safe havens, even of one’s home, must 
have been an enormous emotional blow for the Cossacks.  Their roles as border guards and 
advance wave civilizers already lent a harsh and dangerous cast to their everyday lives. That they 
could not even relax their vigilance in the villages for fear of murder, kidnap, or loss of the 
livestock that made their existence possible undoubtedly contributed to the vehemence of the 
conflict.  As Tornau noted: 
The engagements of our line Cossacks with the mountaineers were ruthless: both sides fought 
under the influence of personal feelings of hatred and revenge for dead brothers, for stolen 
property, and kidnapped wives and children.
207
 
No matter the ferocity or reciprocal savagery of the Cossacks’ retaliation, nothing in Tornau’s 
experience served to curb the incessant attacks.  Russian inability to aggressively cope with the 
mountaineer onslaught while living or serving in a foreign land, surrounded by a population that 
was temporarily subdued at best and openly hostile at worst, created a psychological 
environment of fear and helplessness.  That the Russians perceived themselves as victims of such 
a brutal campaign in many ways outstripped the reality of the losses incurred, but this only 
served to further mythologize the mountaineer raid.   
Describing these devastating attacks on Cossack settlements and Russian camps, Tornau 
listed the crimes for which the Caucasian resistance became infamous.  The raiders would 
descend from the mountains and break through the Line. Once past the forts and Cossack sentry 
posts, they “burned Russian [almost exclusively Cossack] homes, stole horses and cattle, killed 
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every man they met, and kidnapped children and women.” Tornau recounted that the fighting 
was carried out:  
With all the ferocity of a blood feud. Neither the Cossacks nor the Cherkess [Circassians] 
requested or offered mercy. There was no means, no ruse, no perfidious deception considered 
impermissible for Circassians when it came to killing Russians.
208
  
At first glance, these tactics seem like open commissions of total war.  For Tornau, such 
behavior was intrinsically warlike and almost identical in nature to the punitive raids carried out 
on Caucasian auls the Russian army under Yermolov and Vorontsov, but he viewed it through an 
alien cultural lens and inevitably misunderstood the full importance and implications of the raids. 
To the indigenous population, such tactics were an ancient way of life in which “pillaging 
provided the economic base” in the isolated and rugged Caucasian isthmus.209  
The “pillaging” Layton references is the Caucasian cultural phenomena of djigitirovka.  
Marlinsky describes it as a “horse race accompanied by various trials of boldness and 
strength….an imitation of Asiatic combat.”210 Lermontov’s Maxim Maximych is less kind, 
describing a djigit display as “some filthy tramp on a miserable broken-down hack ready to show 
off and play the fool to amuse the company.”211  In essence, it is the almost-ritualized form of 
banditry which canonized bravery, skill with the horse, sword, musket, and knife, and the 
acquisition of property—human and object alike—by cunning, stealth, and violence.  Layton’s 
assessment that the mountaineers lived by their income from such banditry is borne out in 
primary sources.  Even the uncharitable Yermolov, a fierce detractor of mountaineers and 
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especially Chechens, admitted that lack of productive options drove the djigiti to seek “a means 
of subsistence through pillage and brigandage.”212 
Tornau’s understanding of such behavior as intrinsically warlike is problematized both by 
the traditional nature and diverse purposes of such violence. Posterity cannot take his analysis at 
face value, for while djigit raids served with deadly efficacy as the indigenous population’s main 
venue of resistance to the Russian presence, they were at the same time a fundamental means of 
subsistence and a way of life. Regardless of the intent behind such raids, from his vantage point, 
Tornau’s anxiety and revulsion no doubt seemed well warranted; living in constant fear of an 
attack by men of this martial caliber must have strained nerves of even the most stalwart and 
stoic of Russian soldiers.   
It was this strain and the perception that each fort or stanitsa in the Line was alone and 
surrounded by bloodthirsty enemies that precipitated the brutal tactics by which the conquest was 
gradually effected.  Tornau noted that “[t]his type of war demanded special caution and eternal 
readiness to repel the enemy,” and that such vigilance “pushed our border guard forces to their 
limits.”213  This passage openly recognizes the continuous effort and enormous cost to the weary 
defenders to secure Russian communities from mountaineer attacks. By Tornau’s own 
admission, the results were less than perfect and at best established a siege-like stagnated conflict 
in which neither side gained the advantage and both suffered losses of attrition.  For the empire 
to make any headway in conquering the resistance, they had to venture outside their 
fortifications.  Tornau, and the commanders his voice represents, recognized this necessity. 
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To break this stalemate and the indigenous population’s will to resist, Russian officers 
contemplated and utilized tactics designed to overwhelm even their seemingly indomitable 
enemies. Tornau’s memoir conveys the desperation of the situation and the seemingly inevitable 
choice to become more monstrous than the raiders they feared.  In keeping with official 
nationality and his own devotion, Tsar Nicholas frequently exhorted his troops to “be humane in 
war, especially in their dealings with the population of occupied territories….Christian principles 
were not to be forgotten even in combat.”214  Tornau’s memoir suggests the empire failed in 
initial efforts to carry out a more Christian, moral war in the Caucasus, as he states, “On our side, 
the government tried to pacify the mountaineers, depriving them of the ability to harm us.”215 
This statement has twofold ideological significance in this conflict.  On a level widely 
recognizable to Western intellectualism, this is a predicate for justifying the war as a whole and 
specifically the Russians’ morally ambiguous tactical decisions.  If peaceful means—that is, 
those measures used to “pacify” recalcitrant communities—failed, then the empire was left with 
little choice but to act more stringently.  Such paternalistic evaluations of their cause and 
characterizations of the peoples of the Caucasus as their disobedient children echo the orientalist 
discourse Said analyzed.
216
  That “pacification” measures often consisted of hostage taking, 
confiscation or destruction of livestock, appropriating grain and hay stores, and even attacking 
villages preemptively somewhat complicates this reading.  That said, such measures were indeed 
kind compared to the wholesale brutality of retaliatory raids like that on Dady Urt, which 
Yermolov describes in his memoir.  As a result of this failure to “pacify” the mountaineers, 
Tornau notes that:  
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The only means to stop, if slightly, the rapacious endeavors of the mountaineers, consist, 
undoubtedly, in offensive operations and punitive raids on their auls.  Only concern for their own 
families and herds, supported by constant alertness on our part could distract from our borders 
their indefatigable craving for plunder and military action.
217
 
In the end, Tornau and the other officers who drafted and executed military policy 
in the isthmus surrendered to what was, in their view, the inevitable application of 
devastating and overwhelming force.  In the perception of these men, their battle-
hardened Cossack guards were “exhausted,” as were their gentle Christian half-measures 
and alternate options.  In the end, Nicholas’ dream of acquiring the Caucasus with one 
great, decisive battle was shattered, and his military commanders on the ground had to 
implement their more pragmatic plans for the conquest.  In consequence, these officers 
instituted the woodfelling campaigns and systematic raids on villages that would inspire 
and then crush Imam Shamil’s resistance.218  He was the last of Russia’s great 19th 
century enemies and his capture and surrender signaled the end of widespread and 
effective resistance to Russia’s advance.219  
 
 Defining strict relationships of causality—or more simply, ascribing blame—in any 
conflict is a complicated and delicate task.  All too often, answering the seemingly simple 
questions of who started the fighting or who is to blame for underlying iniquities proves illusive 
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or impossible.  In attempting a similar task in the context of Russia’s prolonged, painful conquest 
of the Caucasian isthmus, this thesis can really only conclusively demonstrate that both sides 
genuinely feared the other and each fought with a fierce determination to survive the clash of the 
Orthodox juggernaut with the independent enclaves of Transcaucasia.   
 This clash of cultures is largely non-unique from others throughout history in which 
conflicting values and the dogged pursuit of self-interest superseded the involved parties’ 
capacity for empathy and mutual respect.  The cultural diversity, historical traditions of 
independence, and burgeoning role of Islam in the Caucasus all made the indigenous population 
particularly antagonistic to invasion by strongly Orthodox Russian imperial troops.  The 
coincidence of these factors with romantic literature and the militaristic nationalism of Russia 
made the 19
th
 century conquest one strongly charged with polemical language: differences were 
easy to find and disparage in the other.  Last, but certainly not least, politics on the world stage 
and the rise of high imperialism across Europe increased the stakes of the conflict in this 
relatively tiny part of the globe.  Though the Russians were busy fighting village by village in 
Chechnya and Dagestan, their efforts were part of a larger war to gain and hold advantage over 
the Ottoman Empire and in relation to the powers of Western Europe.  These and a host of other 
contributing factors resulted in the conquest as we know it.  Trying to piece together a 
comprehensive picture of the conflict is, to say the least, intimidating. 
 Still, this thesis examined several key factors that help explain the why the conflict 
manifested as it did.  From the early part of the century and the works of Yermolov and Pushkin, 
through the intervening decades to Tolstoy’s term of service and his retrospective on the end of 
the Caucasian War, literature about the conquest by Russian officers as well as those officers’ 
own memoirs demonstrates the pervasive use of orientalist language to describe their enemies.  
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As authors reached out to a desperately curious Russian audience and soldiers recounted their 
experiences in war, men like Marlinsky and Lermontov enshrined images of saber-wielding 
djigiti in the hearts and minds of their readers.  Many of these readers were the young men who 
would ultimately serve in the Caucasus as officers prosecuting the same war.  Like Lermontov 
and Dmitri Olenin in Tolstoy’s “The Cossacks,” aristocratic youth flocked to the Caucasus with 
specific expectations for the land, war, and women.
220
  Also like Olenin, as officers, these men 
made decisions that shaped their experience of the war. It is not surprising or unexpected that 
some would then shape “their” war to reflect such expectations and preconceived notions.  
Whether they did this knowingly or subconsciously in the confusion of war feels irrelevant when 
examined next to the consequences.   
 Through all their characterizations of the Caucasian peoples and the mountaineer 
resistance as savagely sub-human, the men who waged the war for Russia took on many of these 
same characteristics they projected on their enemies.  Yermolov spared few opportunities to 
curse the Chechens for being thieves and brigands, and yet he spent eleven years conducting 
punitive raids and stealing or driving off the livestock by which the natives lived.  He wrote of 
the debilitating fear in which Russians held their enemies, then promised in his most famous 
quotation that: 
The terror of my name should guard our frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my 
word should be for the native a law more inevitable than death.  Condescension in the eyes of 
Asiatics is a sign of weakness, and out of pure humanity I am inexorably severe.
221
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Tornau decried the unrelenting “insolence” and savagery of Caucasian raids, but when reading 
Yermolov’s description of the Russian raid on Dady Urt, it is hard to imagine greater destruction 
or cruelty.  Tornau’s memoir offers an apparent attempt at objectivity when he admits that “both 
sides” fought this war like a blood feud.  Presumably then, all were culpable in the employment 
of the merciless tactics that cast their shadow over his account of the war.    
In a fascinating and evocative development, The New York Times’ Ellen Barry reported 
on March 16, 2013 that Russian president Vladimir Putin resurrected the Cossacks as a non-
police law enforcement body.  As part of his developing “conservative, nationalist ideology…. 
Cossacks have emerged as a kind of mascot.” Barry explains that “on Russia’s southern flank, 
the Cossack revival is more than an idea.”  The government in Stavropol did more than grant the 
Cossack regiment increasing powers of law enforcement, it also asked them to “stem an influx of 
ethnic minorities, mainly Muslims from the Caucasus.”  The head of security for the Terek 
Cossack Army, Staff Captain Vadim Stadnikov, told Barry that the Cossacks’ familiarity and 
history of cohabitation with “them” makes the Cossacks especially well suited to the job.  He 
added that “[t]hey respect strength here.”222  
The remainder of the article is replete with language sharply dividing Slavic Russians 
from the influx of foreigners, expressions of consternation about the changing ethnic 
composition of steppe cities, and fear of Caucasian youth “behaving too freely.”  One man 
likened the influx of Muslims to a man cuckolding and slapping you during his visit; another 
compared the influx of foreigners and their cultural differences to a metastasized cancer.  
Irrespective of the analogy, in each case the solution to the crisis are Cossack guard patrols.  
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Russians living on the nation’s periphery turn to these legend-made-flesh because of their history 
and reputation.  Advocates of this process in Stavropol point out that such measures work 
because, even among a foreign Muslim population, there is a seemingly universal recognition of 
this history and an understanding that the Cossacks are not bound by law and can mete out their 
own harsh punishments without fear of official censure. 
Barry contextualizes her article with a reference to Tolstoy’s “The Cossacks,” noting that 
he:  
Set it near present-day Stavropol, where the Terek River divided the Muslim-populated mountains 
from the steppes, which were Cossack country. In a scene taught to generations of schoolchildren, 
a young Cossack spots a Chechen swimming across the Terek disguised as a log and shoots 
him.”223 
Tolstoy clearly drew this imagery from Pushkin’s “The Prisoner of the Caucasus,” though he 
chose instead to author a Russian victory to portray the callous violence of which the Cossacks 
were equally culpable.  Just as clearly, Barry’s article highlights the universal popularity and 
pedagogical utility of these stories to “generations of schoolchildren.”  Finally, this text reveals 
the persistent significance of physical and cultural divides along Russia’s southern borders.  Barry 
notes that “[t]he notion of an ethnic dividing line is widely accepted today,” but that demographic 
shifts on the steppe are increasingly challenging the predominance of Russia’s southern Slavs.224  
This tension between peoples, faiths, and cultures periodically lays quiescent, but the need for a 
divide—that symbolic river dividing light from dark—will survive as long as long as liminal 
peoples fear the other side.  Barry interviewed Chieftain of the Romanov Cossacks Boris Pronin 
about the need for the Cossacks as an additional line of defense in this timeless conflict, and his 
response was telling and significant: 
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If a person has a cancer and metastasis has begun, if a professional doctor doesn’t take care of this 
metastasis, he will die….It is the same with society. If there is already metastatic cancer on the 
territory of Stavropol region, one has to take appropriate preventive measures.
225
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